Steel and propane : the efficiency defence and horizontal mergers by Sutherland, Philip
STEEL AND PROPANE: THE EFFICIENCY
DEFENCE AND HORIZONTAL MERGERS*
PHILIP SUTHERLAND†
Professor of Mercantile Law, University of Stellenbosch
INTRODUCTION
The Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the Act) contains comprehensive rules for
the adjudication of mergers by the Competition Commission, Competition
Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court. Adjudicating bodies must decide
whether a merger should be approved, approved subject to conditions or
prohibited. In determining the fate of a merger, the adjudicating body must
determine whether the merger ‘is likely to substantially prevent or lessen
competition’.1 But even when the adjudicating body ﬁnds that a merger will
substantially prevent or lessen competition, s 12A(1)(a)(i) determines that the
merger may yet be saved if it
‘is likely to result in any technological, efﬁciency or other pro-competitive gain
which will be greater than, and offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening
of competition, that may result from the merger, and would not likely be
obtained if the merger is prevented’.2
Mergers can be between vertically related ﬁrms that are on different levels
in the distribution chain, or between ﬁrms that are not in related markets:
so-called conglomerate mergers. These types of mergers seldom raise serious
competition concerns. However, horizontal mergers, that is mergers
between ﬁrms that compete in the same markets, are central to merger
regulation in competition law. In this contribution the impact of s 12(1)(a)(i)
on horizontal mergers will be evaluated.3
Most legal systems allow bodies that consider the competitive conse-
* This contribution originated in a paper presented at the First Competion
Commission, Competition Tribunal and Mandela Institute Conference on Compe-
tition Law and Policy held on 21 May 2007. The invaluable inputs of my
co-presenter Geoff Parr is gratefully acknowledged.
† BComm LLB (Stellenbosch) PhD (Edinburgh).
1 Section 12A(1) read with ss 13(5)(b), 14(1)(b), 16(2) and 17(3).
2 Section 12A(1)(a)(i).
3 For the distinction between horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers see
Philip Sutherland & Katharine Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2000 —
updated to service issue 10) ch 10 and, for the impact on s 12A(1)(a)(i) in mergers that
that are not horizontal, see paras 10.10.1–2 of the samework.
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quences of horizontal mergers to take account of efﬁciencies.4 In Europe the
EC Merger Regulation does not provide for an efﬁciency defence, but such
a defence is set out in the EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines.5 Similarly,
antitrust law in the United States does not formally provide for an efﬁciency
defence, but it has crept into the case law and US Horizontal Merger
Guidelines despite the reservations of several commentators.6 The South
4 See Ann-Britt Everett & Thomas W Ross The Treatment of Efficiencies in Merger
Review: An International Comparison Report for the Canadian Competition Bureau
(2002) 25ff; Canadian Competition Bureau Treatment of Efficiencies in the Canadian
Competition Act Consultation Paper (September 2004) 30; and the OECD Report
Competition Policy and Efficiency Claims in Horizontal Agreements (OECDE 96/65)
(1996) for a comparison of the position in various legal systems.
5 But see the EC Merger Regulation 139/2004 para 29; and see the EC Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines OJ [2004] C 31/5 Part VII. See generally on the development
of the efﬁciency defence in Europe: Mark AWarner ‘Efﬁciencies and merger review
in Canada, the European Community and the United States: Implications for con-
vergence and harmonization’ (1994) 26 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1059 at
1091–9; Margarida Afonso ‘A catalogue of merger defenses under European and
United States antitrust law’ (1992) 33 Harvard International LJ 3. The efﬁciency
defence was for some time given short shrift in Europe and efﬁciencies were some-
times regarded as a reason for treating a merger with suspicion — see Damien Nevan
et al Mergers in Daylight (1993) 62 and 116–17, referred to in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/
Dorbyl Ltd 89/LM/Oct00 paras 46–7, and Daniel J Gifford & Robert T Kudrle
‘Rhetoric and reality in the merger standards of the United States, Canada and the
European Union’ (2005) 72 Antitrust LJ 423 at 458–61. See also Everett & Ross op cit
note 4 at 55–6. The tribunal observed, with reference to Alan A Fisher & Robert H
Lande ‘Efﬁciency considerations in merger enforcement’ (1983) 71 California LR
1580 at 1591, that this was previously also the attitude of the FTC in theUnited States
(see especially at 1593ff). See also the European cases AT&T/NCR IV/M050 paras
28–30; Aerospatiale/Alenia/DeHavilland Case IV/M157 paras 65–71; MSG Media Ser-
vice IV/M 469 paras 100–1; Nordic Satellite Distribution IV/M490.
6 Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law (2004) para 970c; Mark
N Berry ‘Efﬁciencies and horizontal mergers: In search of a defense’ (1996) 33 San
Diego LR 515; United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997) part 4 (henceforth ‘US Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines 1992’); Joseph Kattan ‘Efﬁciency in merger enforcement’
(1994) 62 Antitrust LJ 513 at 515–21; William J Kolasky & Andrew R Dick ‘The
merger guidelines and the integration of efﬁciencies into antitrust review of horizon-
tal mergers’ (2003) 71 Antitrust LJ 7; Paul Rogers ‘The limited case for an efﬁciency
defense in horizontal mergers’ (1983) 58 Tulane LR 503; Warner op cit note 5 at
1100–10; Gregory J Werden ‘An economic perspective on the analysis of merger
efﬁciencies’ (1997) 11 Antitrust 12; David Balto ‘The efﬁciency defense in merger
review: Progress or stagnation’ (2001) 16 Antitrust 74; Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5
at 446–51; Everett & Ross op cit note 4 at 72ff; Lars-Hendrik Röller, Johan Stennek
& Frank Verboven Efficiency Gains from Mergers Report for EC Contract II/98/003
(2000) 57–63. For criticism from Chicago scholars, see Robert Bork The Antitrust
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1993) at 426–9; Richard Posner Antitrust Law: An
Economic Perspective (1976) 8; Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5 at 431–2; andWarner op
cit note 5 at 1068–9.
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African provision is based on s 96 of the Canadian Competition Act,7 which
reads as follows:
‘The Tribunal shall not make an order under section 92 [that is prohibit a
merger] if it ﬁnds that the merger or proposed merger in respect of which the
application is made has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in
efﬁciency that will be greater than, and will offset, the effects of any prevention
or lessening of competition that will result or is likely to result from the merger
or proposed merger and that the gains in efﬁciency would not likely be attained
if the order were made.’
Echoing Captain Kirk of Star Trek fame, the South African tribunal has
observed that the Canadian legislator is unique in ‘boldly treading where
other authorities were still too reticent to go’.8 The defence creates many
problems:9 it raises challenging theoretical questions and is difﬁcult to apply
to factual situations.10 However, an efﬁciency defence, despite its ﬂaws, is
probably necessary in a small economy such as that of South Africa, where
high market shares and concomitant increases in market power often will be
necessary in order to achieve much-needed production efﬁciency.11At most,
these difﬁculties should cause adjudicating authorities to approach efﬁciency
arguments with a healthy and realistic skepticism.12
EFFICIENCY AS A TRUE DEFENCE
In South Africa the efﬁciency defence is a ‘defence’ in the true sense of the
word.13 TheAct envisages that efﬁciencies will become relevant only once it
7 1985, C-34. See on the history of this part of thisAct Commissioner of Competition
v Superior Propane Inc (2002) 18 CPR 4th 417 (Can Comp Trib) para 270ff; Canadian
Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 9–18.
8 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 48; Margaret Sanderson
‘Efﬁciency analysis in Canadian merger cases’ (1997) 65 Antitrust LJ 623 at 624. But
see the preamble to the EC Merger Regulation 139/2004 para 29, which foresees
that efﬁciency issues may be considered.
9 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 81.
10 Ibid paras 43–5 with reference to Richard Posner op cit note 6 at 112; Fisher &
Lande op cit note 5 at 1625, 1652ff and 1660–9; Donald G McFetridge ‘The pros-
pects for the efﬁciency defence’ (1996) 26 Canadian Business LJ 357. See also generally
Bork op cit note 6; Kattan op cit note 6, especially at 521; DennisAYao &Thomas N
Dahdou ‘Information problems in merger decision making and their impact on the
development of an efﬁciency defense’ (1993) 62 Antitrust LJ 23 at 29. On evidential
difﬁculties see generally the text to notes 36, 99–101 and 113–17 below.
11 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 141–2;
Sanderson op cit note 8 at 624; Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 32;
Canadian Competition Bureau Report of the Advisory Panel on Efficiencies (2005) 26–38
and 49ff; Sutherland &Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.74.
12 Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk 83/LM/Jul00 paras 98, 99 and
101–3, with reference to the US case of United States v Philadelphia National Bank 374
US 321 (1963) 371. See Yao & Dahdou op cit note 10 at 30–5; and Röller et al op cit
note 6 at 118 on the strict approach.
13 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc (2000) 7 CPR 4th 385 (Can
Comp Trib) para 399; Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.75. See also Cana-
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is found that the merger substantially prevents or lessens competition.14
Accordingly, the enquiry into the economic consequences of a merger is
divided into two discrete stages. In this sense, the efﬁciency defence in South
Africa can be contrasted with the European orAmerican defences15 as well as
so-called failing-ﬁrm arguments in South Africa.16 In Europe efﬁciencies
must be considered with all other factors when determining whether a
merger is anti-competitive.17 In the United States an efﬁciency defence
‘is not . . . a defense to a ﬁnal conclusion that a merger ‘‘lessens competition’’ or
is ‘‘illegal’’. Rather the defense terminology refers to the rebuttal of a ﬁrst-order
inference from a portion of the evidence . . . that a merger presumptively
lessens competition and violates the statute. That is, it is a defense to a prima
facie case.’18
It may be difﬁcult to bifurcate the consideration of a merger in the manner
mandated by the Act in actual merger evaluations.19 What, for instance,
dian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 32–4 for an evaluation of this approach in
Canada. See Everett & Ross op cit note 4 at 14–18, where this approach is contrasted
with various others. See the strong views expressed in Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 at 134–7.
14 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 41; Schumann Sasol (South
Africa) (Pty) Ltd/Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd 10/CAC/Aug01 at 6; Distillers Corporation
(SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02 paras 210–11.
15 See also, for New Zealand, the New Zealand Commerce Commission’s Merger
andAcquisitions Guidelines 2005 para 7.4; Kattan op cit note 6 at 513.
16 See Iscor Ltd/Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd 67/LM/Dec01 paras 100–3; JD Group
Ltd/Profurn Ltd 60/LM/Aug02 para 108; Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 para
10.7.1.9 on the failing-ﬁrm argument. See Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para
970d2 on the relationship between the failing-ﬁrm argument and the efﬁciency
defence.
17 The EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 76 require ‘an overall
competitive appraisal of the merger’, while para 77 of these guidelines requires that
efﬁciencies be considered as part of the ‘overall assessment of themerger’.
18 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 970c. But efﬁciencies have only been
relied upon by courts in cases where mergers were not found to be anticompetitive:
United States v Carillon Health System 707 F Supp 840 (WDVA1989) 849; United States
v Country Lake Foods 754 F Supp 669 (D Minn 1990) 680. There is no US case where
efﬁciencies have been accepted to offset the prima facie conclusion that a merger
must be condemned: see FTC v University Health 938 F2d 1206 (11 Cir 1991) 1222;
US v Rockford Memorial Corporation 717 F Supp 1251 (ND Ill 1989) 1289–91; FTC v
Staples 970 F Supp 1066 (DDC 1997); United States v United Tote 768 F Supp 1064 (D
Del 1991) 1084–5. The only two mergers approved on the basis of efﬁciency were
FTC v Butterworth Health Corp 946 F Supp 1285 (USWD Mich 1997); United States v
Long Island Jewish Medical Center 983 F Supp 121 (US ED NY 1997), but they both
concern non-proﬁt organizations. See Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane
Inc supra note 7 para 125 and also paras 134–7. See also Timothy J Muris ‘The
government and merger efﬁciencies: Still hostile after all these years’ (1999) 7 George
Mason LR 729 at 751.
19 Sasol Ltd/Sasol Oil Ltd 101/LM/Dec04 paras 538–45; Sanderson op cit note 8 at
624; the Canadian Report of the Advisory Panel on Efficiencies op cit note 11 at 20–1. The
South African Competition Commission has suggested that a factor approach would
be more appropriate, even though that is not reﬂected in the South African system:
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should be made of the argument that a merger is between a number of small
ﬁrms, allowing them to compete more effectively with larger competitors?
Clearly, this is an efﬁciency argument in the broader sense. However, it may
be relevant both to determine whether the merger is anti-competitive and
whether it can be justiﬁed on the basis of efﬁciency.20 Efﬁciency may be
considered to establish the motive for a merger, which may be relevant to
determining whether it is anti-competitive — and again when establishing
whether it can be justiﬁed on the basis of efﬁciency. Accordingly, there are
some South African cases where the reasons for considering efﬁciency
arguments are not clear.21
Still, the South African two-stage approach can be justiﬁed. Efﬁciency
concerns in Europe and the United States can be collapsed into the general
determination of the competition merits of the merger because the focus
with regard to the efﬁciency defence in both countries is on the protection of
consumers.22 South African law, like Canadian law, seems to separate
competition and efﬁciency concerns.23 They thereby allow a much broader
area of application for the efﬁciency defence. Once efﬁciency is considered
on a wider front, a clear and separate analysis of competition and other
efﬁciency arguments is required — as is a neat balancing of anti-competitive
and efﬁciency consequences. This is the most convincing justiﬁcation for
separating the consideration of anti-competitive effects and efﬁciency.
The consideration of efﬁciency is complex and the splitting-up of the
consideration of anti-competitive and efﬁciency concerns means that it is
frequently possible to side-step efﬁciency arguments.24 However, too much
should not be made of this. Efﬁciency issues, on the face of the matter, do not
appear to be consistently more complicated than many of the other aspects
that have to be considered in merger analysis. It is not inconceivable that
there may be cases where it will be easier to show that a merger is efﬁcient
than it will be to prove that it is not anti-competitive. There may be even
more cases where it will be useful to consider the efﬁciencies generated by
the merger in order to support a marginal conclusion that the merger is not
anti-competitive.
The facts that are necessary to prove that a merger is efﬁcient will often be
peculiarly within the knowledge of the merging parties. The separation of
see the Canadian Report of the Advisory Panel on Efficiencies at 46 and at 54, where the
Panel observes that complete bifurcation should not take place. See alsoWarner op cit
note 5 at 1068–9 and the sources referred to there.
20 SeeAreeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 970b on this type of argument.
21 See for instance Clicks Organisation (Pty) Ltd/Milton and Associates (Pty) Ltd
24/LM/May03 para 36.
22 See the text to notes 77 et seq below.
23 Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd/Anglo-American Holdings Ltd
45/LM/Jun02 46/LM/Jun02 (23 October 2002) para 22. See the text to notes 124
and 139 below.
24 If a merger does not raise competition concerns, the need to look at efﬁciency
will not arise (OECDReport op cit note 4 at 5).
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issues will allow the onus to prove efﬁciency to be placed on the parties to
the merger.25 It will be argued, however, that an onus in the traditional sense
is inappropriate in the context of South African merger analysis.26 Other
burdens to put evidence before the court will not necessarily require a
separation of issues in the manner provided for in s 12A — but perhaps the
splitting-up of competition and efﬁciency issues makes it easier to place such
burdens on the merging parties.
Furthermore, South African competition law requires a consideration of
public interest when evaluating a merger. The effect of the merger on public
interest must be considered after evaluation of the competitive and efﬁciency
consequences of the merger.27 The public-interest criteria against which
mergers may be measured are speciﬁcally listed in the Act.28 Some of them,
for example ‘the ability of national industries to compete in international
markets’, will overlap with matters that will be evaluated in determining the
efﬁciencies of a merger. Careful lines will have to be drawn. There will be
cases where the same facts will have to be considered for both purposes. In
terms of s 12A(1)(a)(i) they will be considered in determining whether the
merger is economically efﬁcient, but under s 12A(1)(a)(ii) they will be
evaluated in order to establish whether the merger should be approved
despite being economically inefﬁcient, because public interest requires it.29
Conversely, the question whether previously disadvantaged persons would
have greater access to a particular market is only a public-interest issue and it
should therefore not impact on the efﬁciency analysis.30 The public-interest
element of the South African test could thus both give direction to the
efﬁciency defence and allow for that defence to follow its own course.31
25 Ibid.
26 See the text to note 41 below.
27 Section 12A(1)(b); See, on public interest in South Africa, Sutherland & Kemp
op cit note 3 para 10.11.
28 Section 12A(3).
29 See also the criticism of the distinction between competition and efﬁciency
issues in the text to notes 19–21 above.
30 This was not done properly in Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd/Prime Cure
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 11/LM/Mar05 para 240.
31 Compare the position inAustralia:Australian Merger Guidelines 1999, available
at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/304397 (last accessed on 29 June
2008) paras 5.16–7, 5.171–4 and 6.39–6.41, where much of the consideration of
efﬁciencies takes place in the context of the public-interest evaluation.Anew draft set
of Merger Guidelines was published for comment in February 2008, available at
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=809866&nodeId=
a59169488e28c51ff679799d3ade40b8&fn=Merger%20guidelines%20draft%
202008.pdf (last accessed on 29 June 2008).
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ASPECTS OF THE EFFICIENCY DEFENCE
The tribunal has distinguished ﬁve questions that have to be answered in
respect of the efﬁciency defence.32 They can be consolidated into four issues:
• Who bears the onus of proving efﬁciency?
• What types of gains may be recognized for an efﬁciency defence?
• How should efﬁciency gains caused by a merger be balanced against its
anti-competitive consequences?33
• Efﬁciency must be merger-speciﬁc for purposes of the defence, but when
are efﬁciency beneﬁts merger-speciﬁc?
These issues will be addressed below and three further aspects will be added
to the discussion:
• First, the question whether only efﬁciencies that will be likely, timely
and substantial may form the basis of an efﬁciency defence will be
evaluated.
• Secondly, although the tribunal considered whether, and if so how,
efﬁciencies should be veriﬁed as part of the third question mentioned
above, this issue will be considered separately.
• Finally, the fate of different types of recognized efﬁciencies in South
Africa will be evaluated against the criteria for an efﬁciency defence.
Onus or the duty to put facts before the adjudicating authority
The tribunal has accepted that the onus of proving that a merger should be
justiﬁed on the basis of efﬁciencies rests with the merging parties34 and it has
asserted that this is the approach followed in other countries, including the
Unites States and Canada.35 It has been stressed that
• efﬁciencies are difﬁcult to prove at the notiﬁcation stage and before the
merger has taken place and that it is for the merging parties to show that
such efﬁciencies exist;36 and that
32 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 49. See also Sutherland &
Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.74.
33 The tribunal in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 49 divides this
issue into two questions but they aremerged here.
34 Ibid para 51; Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk supra note 12 para
100; Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd
46/LM/May05 para 113; Sasol Ltd/Sasol Oil Ltd 101/LM/Dec04 para 545; Suther-
land &Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.74–5.
35 For the United States see FTC v Staples Inc 970 F Supp 1066 (D DC 1997) 1089,
and for Canada see Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Hillsdown Holdings
(Canada Ltd) (1992) 41 CPR 3rd 289 (Can Comp Trib) para 141. Despite the some-
what narrow wording, this is apparently what the tribunal intended: Commissioner of
Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 paras 400–3; Commissioner of Competi-
tion v Superior Propane Inc [2001] 3 FC 185 (Fed Ct App) paras 143–54 and 176. See
also generally Röller et al op cit note 6 at 118.
36 See the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4. See also the
argument of Thomas W Ross & Ralph A Winter ‘The efﬁciency defence in merger
law: Economic foundations and recent Canadian developments’ (2005) 71 Antitrust
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• knowledge of efﬁciencies is normally uniquely within the knowledge of
the merging parties.37
Yet, in the South African context, there are also strong arguments against
saddling the merging parties with a full-blown onus to prove efﬁciencies. It is
doubtful whether the US case relied on by the tribunal supports its view;38
and it is also doubtful whether a true onus to prove efﬁciency rests on the
merging parties in Europe. The EC Merger Guidelines merely state that ‘it is
incumbent on the parties’ to provide information that will show that the
merger can be justiﬁed on the basis of efﬁciency.39 But perhaps too much
should not turn on these differences. Both the European and US regimes
differ fundamentally from South African law as they do not provide for a
separate efﬁciency defence — and this may be the reason why merging
parties are not saddled with a full-blown onus in these systems. In Canada the
onus to prove efﬁciency is indeed on the merging parties, but the tribunal’s
reliance on Canadian law is equally problematic. Despite the importance of
Canadian merger law for South Africa, the procedural framework in which
mergers are considered in Canada seems to be more formal and accusatorial
than merger proceedings before the tribunal in South Africa. It is doubtful
whether there is a place for a true burden of proof in the South African
inquisitorial merger proceedings.40 In the OECD Report (in which the
tribunal ﬁnds support for its conclusion) it is stressed that these arguments
sometimes only culminate in a ‘burden of going forward with evidence of
efﬁciencies’.41 This would sufﬁce also for South Africa.
LJ 471 at 479. See generally on evidential difﬁculties the text to note 10 above as well
as the text to notes 99–101 and 113–7 below.
37 OECD Report op cit note 4 at 5; Yao & Dahdou op cit note 10 at 30–5. See the
EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 87, although too much should
not be made of this: in the context of the efﬁciency defence the problem is often that
even the merging parties have informational difﬁculties. See Yao & Dahdou op cit
note 10 at 43–4. In Canada there may generally be no incentive for merging parties to
disclose efﬁciency information as it may be viewed as an admission that a merger is
otherwise anti-competitive. See the Canadian Report of the Advisory Panel on Efficien-
cies op cit note 11 at 4. It should be noted that the problem may be exaggerated in
Canada because of the unique procedures for merger analysis in that country.
38 FTC v Staples Inc 970 F Supp 1066 (DDC 1997) at 1089.
39 For the EU, see EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 87. See
similarly the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4, where the
competition agencies in theUS state that ‘themerging parties will have to substantiate
efﬁciencies’, but the guidelines make it clear that they do not at any stage impose an
onus: see para 0.1.
40 Ironically the same criticism can be brought against the approach to failing ﬁrms
in South Africa, although this issue forms part of the broad analysis of whether a
merger is anti-competitive: see Iscor Ltd/Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd 67/LM/Dec01 and
Sutherland &Kemp op cit note 3 paras 9.4.2, 10.1.7.9.
41 OECDReport op cit note 4 at 5.
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What types of efficiency gains may be recognized for the purpose of the efficiency
defence?
The tribunal has distinguished three types of efﬁciencies:42
First, dynamic efﬁciencies, ie efﬁciencies in innovation, constitute the
most beneﬁcial form of efﬁciency. Innovation improves product and service
quality and the use of resources: precisely those beneﬁts which competition
law seeks to promote.43 In the new Canadian Merger Enforcement
Guidelines 2004 it is stated that dynamic efﬁciencies include ‘those attained
through the optimal introduction of new products, the development of
more efﬁcient production processes, and the improvement of product
quality and service’.44 Innovations may be imitated by competitors, even
though they may be protected as intellectual property, and in this sense
innovations may have the quality of public goods.45 However, the difﬁculties
of calculating and verifying dynamic efﬁciencies will reduce their signiﬁ-
cance.46
Secondly, production efﬁciencies allow ﬁrms to produce more or better
products from the same inputs. They concern resource savings in the
production process that are of an economic nature.47 The different forms of
production efﬁciencies, which will be discussed below, fall broadly into four
types:48
• product-level, plant-level and multi-plant-level savings in the cost of
42 Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 para 10–76. See also the efﬁciencies initially
distinguished in Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk supra note 12 para 104.
See the list of efﬁciencies in Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 47–8; and
see Everett & Ross op cit note 4 at 11–14, where different types of efﬁciencies are
clearly distinguished. The authors also distinguish transactional efﬁciency.
43 The tribunal in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 55 stated that
it is the beneﬁt that ‘competition seeks to induce’, but this formulation does not
appear to be entirely accurate. See also the reliance on s 2(a) in para 79.
44 Para 8.15 (issued by the Canadian Competition Bureau, available at http://
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/01245e.html (last accessed on 29
June 2008). See also the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note
44Appendix II (available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/meg_full.pdf (last accessed on
29 June 2008). See Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 44. See also
Michael E Porter ‘Competition and antitrust: Toward a productivity-based approach
to evaluating mergers and joint ventures’ (2001) 46 Antitrust Bulletin 919, but see the
criticism of Gifford &Kudrle op cit note 5 at 439–42.
45 Kattan op cit note 6 at 513, 514–15, referred to in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl
Ltd supra note 5 para 55; see also Kattan at 522–7.
46 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 55; OECD Report op cit
note 4 at 6 with reference to Appendix II of the Canadian Merger Enforcement
Guidelines supra note 44; US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part
4; Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1634ff; the Canadian Report of the Advisory Panel on
Efficiencies op cit note 11 at 47 and 57.
47 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 55; and see the reliance on
s 2(a) in para 79.
48 CanadianMerger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44 para 8.13.
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production brought about by the merger through economies of scale and
specialization;
• plant and multi-plant efﬁciencies achieved with regard to purchasing,
distribution, advertising, capital raising, complementary resources and
research and development;
• savings in transaction costs brought about by the integration of functions
that were previously performed outside the ﬁrm; and
• savings derived from the transfer of superior production techniques and
know-how from one part of the merged ﬁrm to another.
Thirdly, the tribunal referred to what it called ‘pecuniary efﬁciencies’. It
observed that they are not considered real savings in resources and are ‘less
favoured’49 — even though it may be easy to put numbers to these
‘efﬁciencies’. Tax savings and lower input costs brought about by greater
bargaining power will fall into this category.50 But from an economic
perspective it is not correct to refer to pecuniary beneﬁts as ‘efﬁciencies’.
Pecuniary beneﬁts only lead to a redistribution of resources.51 To declare that
such beneﬁts are merely ‘less favoured’ is to view these beneﬁts too
positively. It is very difﬁcult to see how pecuniary beneﬁts can rationally
serve as a basis for an efﬁciency defence.52 It is contended that the tribunal
was wrong in regarding these beneﬁts as protectable in terms of the
efﬁciency defence. Accordingly, the tribunal cannot be supported53 in so far
as it viewed production efﬁciencies as an intermediate type of efﬁciency
which lies somewhere between dynamic efﬁciencies and pecuniary efﬁcien-
cies.54
49 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 55.
50 Cf Balto op cit note 6 at 77–8.
51 The OECD Report op cit note 4 at 6, to which the tribunal refers, does not use
the term ‘pecuniary beneﬁts’. The tribunal in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra
note 5 para 81 appeared to regard redistribution and pecuniary beneﬁts as different
things, but they are not.
52 TheOECDReport op cit note 4 at 6 also uses the expression ‘less favoured’, but
see especially s 96(3) of the Canadian Competition Act 1985, which states that a
‘redistribution of income’ will not be an efﬁciency: Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 paras 430 and 495; Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 35 para 82; Commissioner of Competition v Superior
Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 339–45; Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines
1991 op cit note 44 para 5.3. Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 970 call these
mere ‘pecuniary’ or ‘personal’ economies, but accept that they ‘cannot form the basis
for an efﬁciencies defence’. Warner op cit note 5 at 1059 and 1072–4 argues that
pecuniary beneﬁts should be acknowledged in terms of the efﬁciency defence.
53 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 55.
54 Pecuniary beneﬁts were not taken seriously in the following cases: Massmart
Holdings Ltd/Moresport Ltd 62/LM/Jul05 para 201 and Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty)
Ltd/Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 11/LM/Mar05 para 239. See also the strict
approach initially followed in Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk supra
note 12 paras 99 and 103. But cf theAustralian position: Everett & Ross op cit note 4
at 19.
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The tribunal collectively referred to ‘technological, efﬁciency and other
pro-competitive gains’, referred to in the Act, as efﬁciency gains.55 It is not
quite clear how the three types of gains mentioned in the Act should be
distinguished. The tribunal observed that
‘our concept of efﬁciency is used in . . . combination with the words
‘‘technological or other pro-competitive gain’’. Adopting an eiusdem generis
approach and trying to discern a common meaning between these three words,
this would suggest that in this context, efﬁciencies that equate to ‘‘technologi-
cal gains’’ i.e. dynamic efﬁciencies or ‘‘pro-competitive gains’’ i.e. those that
constitute real economies, not mere pecuniary gains, are to be favoured.’56
This is a valiant attempt to make sense of the three terms used in s 12A.
However, it is not clear that ‘technological efﬁciencies’ can be equated with
dynamic efﬁciencies or ‘other pro-competitive gains’ with real economies.
The dictum cannot be accepted in so far as it suggests that ‘efﬁciency’ could
mean more than economic or real efﬁciency. It probably would have sufﬁced
if the legislator had merely provided that a merger could be justiﬁed on the
basis of efﬁciency gains.57
The tribunal has left open the question whether only reductions in
marginal cost will be relevant for the efﬁciency defence and whether savings
of ﬁxed costs also may be taken into account.58 After all, ﬁxed costs do not
inﬂuence pricing decisions in the short run.59 The better view is that both
can support an efﬁciency defence. The distinction between ﬁxed and
variable cost applies to the short run, whereas in the long run, all costs are
variable. Therefore, costs that are ﬁxed in the short run will inﬂuence pricing
in the long term and the line between ﬁxed and variable cost is impossible to
draw clearly. However, less weight may be attached to a saving in ﬁxed costs
if there will be long delays in the realization of such efﬁciencies.60
55 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 41.
56 Ibid para 78.
57 This is the approach followed in s 6 of the Canadian Competition Act, which
refers only to ‘gains in efﬁciency’. Apparently the expression ‘technological, efﬁ-
ciency or other pro-competitive gains’ was created by combining elements of art 81
of the European Community Treaty and elements of the Canadian CompetitionAct
1985.
58 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 60 with reference to Kattan
op cit note 6 at 533. See Kattan on the differences regarding savings in ﬁxed and
variable costs where a plant is closed post-merger because of excess capacity. See
Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44 para 8.13n97. See also
Röller et al op cit note 6 at 116 on ‘pass through’ and the distinction between ﬁxed
and variable costs.
59 FTC v HJ Heinz 246 F 3d 708 (DCCir 2001).
60 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 974d; Warner op cit note 5 at 1070.
See EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 80 which attach greater
weight to savings in variable costs. Para 8.14 of the Canadian Merger Enforcement
Guidelines 2004 (op cit note 44) shows clearly that both are relevant. See on timeli-
ness the text to notes 167–8 below.
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How should efficiency gains be measured and balanced against anti-competitive
effects?
The tribunal in the Trident matter lumped together three questions, namely
how should
• efﬁciencies and losses caused by a merger be measured;
• efﬁciencies be veriﬁed; and
• the competitive losses caused by the merger and the efﬁciencies that arise
from it be compared?61
These concerns should ideally be separated, however, and therefore the
measurement and comparison of competitive losses and efﬁciency beneﬁts
will be discussed here while the veriﬁcation of efﬁciencies will be taken up
later.62
TYPES OF EFFICIENCIES
Under the inﬂuence of the Chicago School, it has become trite that the
purpose of competition law is to promote efﬁciency through competition.63
Normally, efﬁciency in this context means allocative efﬁciency.64 The
purpose of competition law is to ensure that competitive markets allocate the
production of products and the purchase of products by consumers
efﬁciently. In a perfectly competitive market the marginal cost, or cost of the
last unit produced, will equal the price that consumers will be charged for the
product. The cost to society of producing it will be equal to the price that the
last consumer will pay for it. Where a ﬁrm has market power, it will charge a
price that will exceed the marginal cost of the last unit that it will produce.
Output will be lower, and prices will be higher than in a competitive market.
Society will suffer a dead-weight loss, as some consumers will no longer
purchase the product. The cost of purchasing the product will be higher than
both the cost to society of producing it, and the amount of money that the
last consumers, who would have purchased it in a competitive market,
61 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 paras 63–7.
62 See the text to notes 164–77 below.
63 See generally on the different efﬁciency goals of competition law Herbert Hov-
enkamp Federal Antitrust Policy (1999) para 2.3c; Berry op cit note 6 at 530ff; F M
Scherer ‘Antitrust, efﬁciency and progress’ (1987) 62 New York University LR 998;
Warner op cit note 5 at 1062ff; Joseph F Brodley ‘The economic goals of antitrust:
Efﬁciency, consumer welfare and technological progress’ (1987) 62 New York Univer-
sity LR 1020 at 1025–30; John J Flynn ‘Antitrust policy, innovation efﬁciencies, and
the suppression of technology’ (1998) 66 Antitrust LJ 487 at 494–8. See also the
discussion of efﬁciency in Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk supra note 12
paras 99 and 103.
64 Flynn op cit note 63 at 489, who speaks of the ‘current preoccupation with
allocative efﬁciencies as the sole or primary value of antitrust policy’; Hovenkamp op
cit note 63 para 2.2b, with reference to Bork op cit note 6 at 91: ‘The whole task of
antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efﬁciency without
impairing productive efﬁciency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in
consumer welfare.’
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would have been prepared to pay for it. These consumers will then have to
purchase alternative products from which they will not derive the same
utility.
It is sometimes said that competition law also promotes production and
dynamic efﬁciency, but both these types of efﬁciencies play a supporting role
to allocative efﬁciency. The promotion of production efﬁciency is not
regarded as conﬂicting with the achievement of allocative efﬁciency. This is
normally illustrated by means of a highly stylized model: In a perfectly
competitive market, the price that ﬁrms will receive will equal marginal cost.
If ﬁrms receive a price that is higher than the average cost of producing that
output, then they will receive an economic proﬁt even though the price
received for the last unit produced equals its cost. New ﬁrms will enter the
market, total supply in the market will increase, prices will be reduced, and
the existing ﬁrms will again reduce their output to ensure that their marginal
costs still equal the price received in the market. This process will continue
until all ﬁrms produce at the point where their marginal costs equals average
costs which, mathematically speaking, will in every case be at the point
where average cost is at its lowest point and where ﬁrms produce most
efﬁciently. This position is referred to as producing ‘at capacity’. Where a
ﬁrm produces for a price at which marginal cost is lower than average cost, it
makes a loss and will have to exit the market if that situation continues. Only
the ﬁrms that produce for a price that at least covers their average cost will
ultimately survive.
Competition law is only beginning to accommodate dynamic efﬁciency
into its structures. When it comes to innovation, it is impossible to
generalize. In some situations the existence of market power may promote
innovation and in others competition may hinder it. Knowledge about the
factors that determine whether a merger will promote dynamic efﬁciency
even if it creates market power is still in the process of being developed.65
The Williamson trade-off
However, where a competition authority has to decide whether a merger
can be justiﬁed on the basis of dynamic or production efﬁciency,
adjudicating bodies are concerned with a possible head-on conﬂict between
65 Hovenkamp op cit note 63 para 1.3c; Scherer op cit note 63 at 1010–12; and
Richard J Gilbert & Steven C Sunshine ‘Incorporating dynamic efﬁciency concerns
in merger analysis: The use of innovation markets’ (1995) 63 Antitrust LJ 569, espe-
cially at 573, where it is stated that ‘[f]or many years, innovation shared the general
neglect bestowed by antitrust authorities on other forms of non-price competition.
However, innovation’s crucial role in generating economic growth and in enhancing
global competitiveness warrants a more central role in antitrust analysis.’ See also S
Ahn Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence
OECD Economics Department Working Paper No 317 (2002); the Canadian Report
of the Advisory Panel on Efficiencies op cit note 11 at 40ff.
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production or dynamic efﬁciency and allocative efﬁciency.66 This conﬂict
was described by the economist Oliver Williamson,67 who pointed out that
• amerger may create market power and allocative inefﬁciency in the form
of a dead-weight loss, which will constitute a welfare loss;
• but that a merger may also achieve more efﬁcient production, which will
constitute a welfare gain;
• and that it can be shown mathematically that the welfare gain through
production efﬁciency will often exceed the loss caused by allocative
inefﬁciency caused by the merger.
However, even Williamson was conscious of the limits of his model.68 It is
dependent upon assumptions that are seldom reﬂected in real-world
markets. He assumed that the merger was concluded in a perfectly
competitive market and caused the market to become monopolistic.
Where the merging ﬁrms already have market power before the merger,
an increase in market power will lead to a greater increase to the dead-weight
loss than in the circumstances modelled by Williamson. At the competitive
price the beneﬁt received by consumers from purchasing a product equals
the cost of producing it. The welfare lost by an increase in price from this
point will be small. But where a merger between ﬁrms which already charge
prices that are above the competitive level allow the merged ﬁrm further to
increase prices, then it will affect consumers who derive utility from that
product that far exceeds the cost of producing it. The welfare lost from
similar increases in price will therefore differ depending on whether the
increase is made from the competitive price or a price above the competitive
price.69
If the merger does not lead to the merged ﬁrm’s becoming a single-ﬁrm
monopoly, other ﬁrms may also charge higher prices but the efﬁciency gains
will be realized only by the merged ﬁrm.70 The beneﬁt received from the
efﬁciency gain will be smaller than in the situation where the merged ﬁrm
66 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 para 5.1. Gifford
&Kudrle op cit note 5 at 426–7.
67 O E Williamson ‘Economies as an antitrust defence: The welfare tradeoffs’
(1968) 58 American Economic Review 18–36, referred to in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl
Ltd supra note 5 paras 42–3. See Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1624ff; Sutherland &
Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.81–2. Kattan op cit note 6 at 513 observes that the
contribution of Williamson has spurred a cottage industry that researches the impact
of his work.
68 O E Williamson ‘Economies as an antitrust defense: Correction and reply’
(1968) 58 American Economic Review 1332; ‘Allocative efﬁciency and the limits of
antitrust’ American Economic Review Papers and Processes (1969) 105; ‘Economies as an
antitrust defense: Reply’ (1969) 59 American Economic Review 954; ‘Economies as an
antitrust defence: The welfare tradeoffs revisited’ (1977) 125 University of Pennsylvania
LR 699.
69 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 970e; Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane supra note 7 paras 163–9.
70 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 970e. See also Trident Steel (Pty)
Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 65, with reference toWKipViscusi, John MVernon
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becomes a single-ﬁrm monopolist, and the dead-weight loss will have to be
calculated on the basis of higher prices charged by other ﬁrms if they also
increase their prices.71
Moreover, the Williamson trade-off assumes that productive efﬁciency
cannot be achieved without a merger and without increasing the market
power of the ﬁrms achieving the efﬁciency. In an expanding market, ﬁrms
may improve efﬁciency without obtaining market power. If this possibility
exists, then the efﬁciencies realized by the merger do not include the
efﬁciencies that would have been realized without the merger. Furthermore,
the dead-weight loss will have to be calculated with reference to the lower
marginal cost that would have prevailed if efﬁciencies were achieved without
the merger. The beneﬁts of the merger will be much reduced and may
become nil if the same production efﬁciencies could have been achieved
without the merger. In such circumstances a large dead-weight loss will be
the only legacy of the merger.72
Next, the Williamson trade-off does not discount possible so-called
X-inefﬁciencies. A ﬁrm that has market power may become slack and this
may cause inefﬁciencies. However, it is controversial whether these
inefﬁciencies will occur in practice. Even monopolists may still be driven by
the urge to maximize proﬁts.73
Finally, the Williamson trade-off assumes that transfers of surplus will be
irrelevant.74 Where the merging ﬁrms obtain some market power, it will
create a dead-weight loss as well as a redistribution of surplus away from
consumers75 and in favour of producers.76 Williamson accepts that the
redistribution of surplus should be ignored in determining the impact of
efﬁciency on economic welfare. But it should be asked whether efﬁciencies
ought to be acknowledged in competition law only if they are passed on to
consumers or if consumers are not harmed by mergers that achieve
efﬁciency.
& Joseph E Harrington Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 2 ed (1995) 203 (some-
what strangely referred to in the case).
71 Cf the argument in Kattan op cit note 6 at 513 and 514–5 about diffusion of
efﬁciencies through a market, and the text to note 45. See also on positive and
negative externalities caused by mergers Röller et al op cit note 6 at 32–3 and 116–17.
See Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane supra note 7 paras 220–2 and 227–8.
72 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 970e.
73 See Scherer op cit note 63 at 1004–6; Canadian Merger Enforcement Guide-
lines 2004 op cit note 44 para 8.29; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane
supra note 7 para 232. See generally Röller et al op cit note 6 at 19–24; Everett &
Ross op cit note 4 at 12.
74 Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1644ff.
75 Consumer surplus is the difference between the monetary value that particular
consumers place on a product and the price that they pay for it in the market: see Ross
&Winter op cit note 36 at 474, especially n11.
76 Producer surplus is the difference between the price which a producer receives
for a product and the cost of producing it: see Ross & Winter op cit note 36 at
473n10.
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The question whether the distributional effects of a merger should be
taken into account cannot be answered without an investigation of the very
soul of competition law. It is not surprising that this conundrum has been
solved in different ways in different jurisdictions.
The standards that protect comsumers
In Europe and the United States efﬁciencies will be considered by
adjudicating authorities only if consumers will not be harmed by the
merger.77 Three consumer-welfare standards have crystallized by which
harm to consumers can be discounted.
In most legal systems the price standard is applied.78 According to this
standard, efﬁciencies may be considered only if post-merger prices will not
exceed pre-merger prices, despite any increase in market power. If the
merged ﬁrm acquires market power through the merger, then the depression
in prices caused by efﬁciencies must outweigh the increase in price brought
about by an exercise of market power by the merged ﬁrm. The tribunal in
Trident criticized this type of test on the basis that it, like other price-control
remedies, was inappropriate because it meant that the regulator would
become a price-setter.79 However, this criticism is unwarranted. An
adjudicating body that uses the price standard does not set prices. This is
done by the market both pre-merger and post-merger. The body merely
determines whether that price would be appropriate from the perspective of
competition law. It is often argued that the price standard is easier to apply
than other standards. In some cases this may be true, since adjudicating
authorities have experience in predicting and evaluating price movements.
However, this beneﬁt must not be exaggerated. It may sometimes be difﬁcult
to predict the movement of prices post-merger.80
According to the consumer-surplus standard the consumer surplus must not
77 FTC v University Hospital 938 F2d 1206 (11th Cir 1991) 1223; FTC v Staples Inc
supra note 18 at 1090; US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4;
EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 paras 76–84. See the discussion of the
United States position in Canada in Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc
supra note 7 paras 114–59. See the criticism of the requirement that beneﬁts must be
‘passed on’ to consumers by Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5 at 443–6 and the discus-
sion of the US approach at 451–4. See generally Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3
para 10.82–4.
78 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4. See the description
of this standard in Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane supra note 7 paras
87–9; Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5 at 435–6; Everett & Ross op cit note 4 at 20–1.
New Zealand’s Merger and Acquisitions Guidelines op cit note 15 at para 7.4. In
Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 87–9 the tribunal
was critical of what it called the ‘modiﬁed’price standard.
79 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 75. The statement of the
tribunal was made generally, although it follows the question whether a merger can
be unscrambled if efﬁciencies are not achieved.
80 Röller et al op cit note 6 at 25ff and the authorities mentioned; Ross & Winter
op cit note 36 at 479; and see the text to notes 91 and 99–101 below.
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be reduced by the merger.81 This standard has almost the same effect as the
price standard, but the focus is not on price and therefore it accounts for
non-price beneﬁts to consumers. Moreover, some of the difﬁculties in
determining prices may be avoided. Nevertheless, the precise calculation of
the shifts in welfare will throw up its own difﬁculties. Adjudicating bodies
generally are quite used to dealing with, as well as predicting, prices but they
will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to calculate consumer surplus, producer surplus and the
dead-weight loss.
In terms of the resource-saving standard only the increase in the producer
surplus brought about by the resource saving realized through the merger
must be compared to the dead-weight loss and the part of the consumer
surplus transferred to the producer because of the merger. The merger should
be allowed only if the former exceeds the latter.82 The same difﬁculties that
arise with regard to the previous standard will also be prevalent here.
Furthermore, all these standards can be criticized on the basis that they do
not accurately balance the welfare consequences of a merger. Generally, the
redistribution of surplus is not regarded as relevant in competition law.
Where surplus is transferred from consumers to producers it beneﬁts the
shareholders of producers. These producers may be rich but they may also be
the pension funds of blue-collar workers. These standards do not pay
sufﬁcient attention to the nature of the consumers and producers affected by
the redistribution.83 A redistribution is not a loss to the economy. Moreover,
macro-economic tools such as taxes and subsidies are better at ensuring an
equitable distribution of wealth.84 If all redistributive effects of a merger are
to be taken into account, it will limit the realm of the efﬁciency defence
considerably.85
81 See the discussion and criticism in Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane
Inc supra note 7 paras 90–4; Everett &Ross op cit note 4 at 21.
82 Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5 at 436 and the reference to the Canadian sources
in notes 47 and 48, where it is called the consumer surplus standard.
83 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 paras 428–30;
Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 93–4, 160, 182–
215, 328–32 and 372.
84 Warner op cit note 5 at 1066; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc
supra note 13 para 438. But see the criticism of Ross & Winter op cit note 36 at 479
and 500–1.
85 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 69 especially n54; Commis-
sioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 187–91 and especially
paras 375–6; Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 971b. See Robert Pitofsky
‘Proposals for revised United States merger enforcement in a global economy’ (1992)
81 Georgetown LJ 192 at 207–8, who called the pass-through requirement a ‘killer
requirement’; Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5 at 428–9. See also the reﬁned argument
of Stephen F Ross ‘Afterword — did the Canadian Parliament really permit mergers
that exploit Canadian consumers so the world can be more efﬁcient?’ (1997) 65
Antitrust LJ 641 at 647–8. For a powerful argument that supports these standards, see
Duarte Brito & Margarida Catalao-Lopes Mergers and Acquisitions: The Industrial Orga-
nization Perspective (2006) at 160–8. The authors state that these standards may prevent
costly bidding and stimulate more efﬁcient mergers.
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The total welfare standard
In Canada the majority of the tribunal in its ﬁrst Superior Propane decision86
applied the total-welfare standard that accords with the approach of William-
son.87 According to this standard a merger that creates some market power
for the merged ﬁrm should be allowed as long as the surplus created through
greater efﬁciency exceeds the dead-weight loss attributable to the merger.
The distributional effects of the merger will be ignored and the interests of
consumers will not be directly protected.
It may also be argued that this standard cannot be applied effectively
because of evidential difﬁculties, but it does not seem more difﬁcult to apply
than any of the other standards.88 It has been contended that the total welfare
standard may make it difﬁcult for competition authorities to prohibit a
merger.89 However, ironically, the limits of the Williamson trade-off further
justify the application of a total-welfare standard. Clearly, efﬁciencies will not
always serve to justify a merger and the application of the total welfare
standard will not make merger reviews redundant.90 Furthermore, those
who regard the protection of consumers as the main purpose of competition
law reject this standard, since it sacriﬁces consumer surplus on the altar of
efﬁciency91 — to which the counter-argument is, of course, that consumers
do not have a monopoly on direct competition-law protection. But even if
the purpose of competition law is viewed more broadly, namely as the
promotion of efﬁciency through competition, the standard may still be
unacceptable. Competition law is not there to promote efﬁciency generally.
An answer to this statement may be that the efﬁciency defence is not meant
to ensure that competition law meets its main objective, but rather that it is
86 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 paras 422–47,
where the tribunal interpreted the term ‘effects’ in s 96 and gave a number of reasons
why it believed that the total-welfare standard had to be applied.
87 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 paras 5.1 and 5.5
(although this part no longer applied after Commissioner of Competition v Superior Pro-
pane Inc supra note 35); BrianAFacey et al ‘The Canadian competition tribunal gets it
right’ (2000) 15 Antitrust 70; Sanderson op cit note 8 at 626; Gifford & Kudrle op cit
note 5 at 437–8; Michael Trebilcock Canadian Competition Policy (2002) at 147–8. See
Ross & Winter op cit note 36 at 473–4 for the meaning of total-surplus or welfare
standard.
88 Rogers op cit note 6 at 524; Berry op cit note 6 at 542. See also Yao & Dahdou
op cit note 10 paras 41–4. Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1638 criticize the total-
surplus standard on the basis that ‘[t]hese additional considerations reinforce our
conclusion that merger enforcement ofﬁcials would virtually never be able to quan-
tify the costs and beneﬁts of particular mergers accurately enough for the kind of
objective balancing that the naive model makes appear so simple’. But see Ross &
Winter op cit note 36 at 479, who comment on the relative simplicity of the total
welfare standard.
89 AlanA Fisher, Robert H Lande & Stephen F Ross ‘The Canadian Competition
Tribunal gets it wrong’ (2000) 15 Antitrust LJ 71 at 78–9.
90 Sanderson op cit note 8 at 629; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc
supra note 7 paras 160–73.
91 Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1644ff.
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intended to see to it that the promotion of competition does not take place at
the expense of efﬁciency, especially as efﬁciency also forms the rationale for
the promotion of competition.92 However, the distributional effects of
efﬁcient mergers have remained a source of controversy.93
The balancing-weight standard
In the second Superior Propane decision94 of the Canadian tribunal, the
redetermination judgment, a via media between the two extremes was taken
after the courts rejected the total-welfare standard expounded in the ﬁrst
judgment: the balancing-weight approach takes the distributive effects of an
efﬁcient merger into consideration, but does so in a more subtle manner than
the total-welfare standard. It will make sense to apply this test only if the
merger meets the total-surplus standard but consumers will be worse off
post-merger. According to this standard, the beneﬁt to producers owing to
greater efﬁciency and redistribution from consumers must be compared to
the loss suffered by consumers both because of dead-weight losses caused by
the merger and the redistribution of surplus to producers. A weight must
then be attached to the loss to consumers that balances this loss with the
beneﬁts of producers. The impact of the redistribution must then be
evaluated in the circumstances of the particular case. It must be determined
whether it will be possible to adjust the loss to consumers by an amount that
is equal to, or greater than, the balancing weight: if so, then the merger
should not be allowed on the basis of efﬁciency; if not, the merger should be
approved on the basis of efﬁciency. Thus, the balancing weight W must be
92 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 paras 412–13.
See Ross & Winter op cit note 36 at 474 and Kolasky & Dick op cit note 6 at 207 and
Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 71–7.
93 Fisher, Lande & Ross op cit note 86 especially at 77; Ross & Winter op cit note
36 at 475–7; Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 45 and the sources cited
there. The acceptance of the total-welfare standard in Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 was rejected by the Federal Appeal Court in Com-
missioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 35 paras 75–142 and 160ff. See
the summary in paras 8–37. See also the discussion in Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 95–101. See further the critical approach earlier
expressed by Reed J in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Hillsdown Hold-
ings (Canada Ltd) supra note 35 para 131, discussed by Calvin S Goldman & John D
Bodrug ‘The Hillsdown and Southam decisions: The ﬁrst round of contested mergers
under the CompetitionAct’ (1993) 38 McGill LJ 724 at 735ff; Warner op cit note 5 at
1088–9.
94 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 102–13,
212–3 and 333–8; Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 paras 10.84–5. It was originally
proposed for the Commission by Professor G C Townley, but was rejected in Com-
missioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13: see paras 387 and 420. It
was favoured by the Federal Appeal Court in Commissioner of Competition v Superior
Propane Inc supra note 35 paras 141–2. This approach was afﬁrmed on appeal Commis-
sioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc [2003] 3 FC 529 (Fed Ct App). See also
Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5 at 438 and 454–6; Ross & Winter op cit note 36 at
472–3 and 487ff.
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calculated as follows: 1(A+B) = W(A+C) where A is the redistributed
surplus B is the efﬁciency gain and C is the dead-weight loss. If the weight
attached to the interests of consumers is equal to or exceeds W then the
merger should not be allowed on efﬁciency grounds.
How, then, according to the Canadian tribunal, was the weight given to
the interests of consumers to be calculated? The Tribunal evaluated the
extent to which consumers were likely to beneﬁt indirectly from the
redistribution and stated that95
‘the correct weight should be established by society or should reﬂect social
attitudes toward equity among different income classes. There may be several
sources from which the proper weighting can be inferred, one such being the
tax system, which is explicitly, although not solely, concerned with equity’.
Despite its obvious strengths,96 this standard also has met with some
resistance.97
First, consumers cannot be treated as a homogeneous group. The interests
of different groups of consumers may be considered in determining the
balancing weight, but ultimately a single weight will have to be given to
consumer interests. This is not ideal, but the balancing-weights standard is an
improvement on the price and total-welfare standards.98 In many cases it will
remain very difﬁcult accurately to calculate producer and consumer surplus
as well as the dead-weight loss. The balancing-weight standard is vague and
allows adjudicating authorities considerable discretion.99 Nevertheless, a
competition system that wants to consider distributional effects appropriately
will have to live with these uncertainties. Adjudicating authorities should not
require precise calculation of each aspect, but should be prepared to make
impressionistic decisions where accurate quantitative information is not
available.100 Moreover, the standard must not be applied in a static way and
95 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 para 110, and see
also para 325ff. See further Ross &Winter op cit note 36 at 489ff.
96 Ross & Winter op cit note 36. See how this test was expanded by Gifford &
Kudrle op cit note 5 at 463ff.
97 Sanderson op cit note 8 at 627–8.
98 See Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 334–5
and 338 as well as 100, albeit in a slightly different context.
99 Ibid paras 327 et seq illustrates the difﬁculties that arise here; see also paras
372–4; the Canadian Report of the Advisory Panel on Efficiencies op cit note 11 at 54.
100 Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 27–9; the Canadian Merger
Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 para 5.4 and the reference therein to
measurable and immeasurable aspects. See on the discussion of the qualititative and
quantitative approach Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7
paras 233, 241, 247, 283, 310, 335 and 376, as well as the dissent in paras 400, and
425–30; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 35 paras 80 and
110–9; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 94 paras 34–8 and
64; Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 29; Canadian Merger Enforce-
ment Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44 paras 8.15 and 8.21; Sanderson op cit note 8 at
630. See also Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 paras 448
and 460 (although this was stated in the context of the total welfare standard and the
strong views expressed in the minority judgment of Christine Lloyd in para 503ff).
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changes to the market must be taken into account — although the
consideration of dynamic efﬁciency will remain difﬁcult.101
Secondly, a merger also may have effects on related markets.102 Where
consumers in the relevant market are intermediate ﬁrms and they pass price
increases on to their consumers, it may be necessary to consider these
redistributive effects.103 But it may be almost impossible to calculate the
effects of a merger on these markets, and it will be even more difﬁcult to
determine the value that should be placed on these losses for purposes of
doing the trade-off in the relevant market where the merger occurs.
However, this difﬁculty can be overcome if the traditional approach which
focuses on the market on which the merger occurs and clearly related
markets, is followed.
Thirdly, it may be asked whether distributional effects of mergers can be
considered in reverse. Why should an anti-competitive merger of a ﬁrm that
produces luxury goods, but in which a trade union has a large interest, not be
allowed on the basis that many of its shareholders are poor blue-collar
workers, even if it does not lead to any efﬁciencies?104 Why not consider the
interests of employees of the merging ﬁrms? Perhaps if distributional effects
enter the evaluation here, there is also an argument for acknowledging
pecuniary beneﬁts of the merger as something that should count for or
against the merger depending on the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless,
the answer to these contentions is that the balancing-weight standard should
only be allowed to tip the scales in favour of consumers because of their
central role as a protected class in competitive law.
Hence, despite its weaknesses, it seems that the balancing-weight standard
is preferable to the other standards described above. After the ﬁnal Superior
Propane case a Bill that was to amend s 96 of the Canadian Competition Act
was proposed.105 This Bill was to make it clear that beneﬁt to consumers had
SeeRoss &Winter op cit note 36 at 479, who argue that the onus in Canada, which is
on the merging parties, will mean that the price standard will often apply de facto.
Similar arguments will apply where the approach to onus suggested in this contribu-
tion is followed, eg in South Africa. See the text to note 41 above. See generally on
evidential difﬁculties the text to notes 10 and 36 above as well as to notes 113–7
below.
101 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 256–8 and
414–16; Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5, especially at 434–40 and 463ff, perhaps take
it too far, although they give some indication of a dynamic application of this
approach. See the criticism of Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1631.
102 SeeRoss &Winter op cit note 36 at 483–7 and 494–5.
103 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 250–5 and
302 et seq, where the Canadian imperative of considering the interests of small and
medium enterprises (duplicated in SouthAfrica in s 2 of theAct) was considered. See
also paras 358–64, and in the minority judgment paras 410–13; as well as Trident Steel
(Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 65.
104 See Trebilcock op cit note 87 at 149–50 and Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 para 329ff.
105 RS, 1985, C-34.
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to be considered in terms of s 96. The Bill was passed by the House of
Commons but, following an election, it died on the Order Paper of the
Canadian Senate.106
The South African approach
How have South African competition authorities responded to the problem
of weighing positive consequences against negative effects? The Act states
that efﬁciencies will justify a merger only when they are ‘greater than, and
offset’ the anti-competitive effects of the merger.107 On the face of it, this
requires a balancing of efﬁciencies and anti-competitive consequences. This
is initially how the Tribunal viewed the matter. Indeed, the view was
originally expressed that mergers could be approved on the basis of
efﬁciencies only if the efﬁciency beneﬁts clearly exceeded anti-competitive
losses by some margin.108 The scene was set for the development of a
standard for performing this balancing act.
However, the tribunal tried to side-step these issues in the Trident case.109
It distinguished between a formulaic approach and a discretionary approach
to trade-off analysis. It asserted that a formulaic approach was followed by the
Canadian tribunal in the ﬁrst Superior Propane case. According to the
formulaic approach, the problem of balancing the effects of increased market
power and efﬁciency has to be considered ‘as an economist would do in a
classroom demonstrating Williamson’s trade off’. Efﬁciency claimed and the
dead-weight loss have to be calculated in terms of a formula and then
compared.110 The tribunal contrasted this with the discretionary approach,
which it thought prevailed in the United States.111 This approach relies on
discretion rather than an equation.
The tribunal accepted that the discretionary approach leads to uncertainty
106 Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 3–4.
107 Section 12A(1)(a)(i). Compare the position in Canada in the Canadian Merger
Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 para 5.4. See the interpretation of the
term ‘offset’ in Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 44 para
449; and Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 35 para 80.
108 Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk supra note 12 para 99, especially
nn19 and 103; on the notion expressed here that the comparison of beneﬁts and losses
has to concern like interests, see Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc
supra note 7 para 57. See also Inzuzo Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd/PG Bison Hold-
ings (Pty) Ltd 12/LM/Feb04 at 10, where the tribunal asserted that the imposition of
conditions made it unnecessary to weigh efﬁciencies and anti-competitive effects.
109 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 paras 65–75; Sutherland & Kemp
op cit note 3 paras 10.79–10.81.
110 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 65, referring to Commissioner
of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 and Fisher & Lande op cit note 5.
See alsoRoss &Winter op cit note 36 at 471–2.
111 With reference to the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part
4.Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 probably contributed to this perception — see
the text to notes 114 and 115 below. Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1664ff analyze
prosecutorial discretion as an alternative to the fullWilliamson trade-off.
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and, conversely, that it may be difﬁcult to compare the beneﬁts and losses
caused by a merger in terms of the formulaic approach, because they are
often incomparable and may not be achieved in the same markets. It
therefore attempted to ﬁnd common ground between these approaches,
stating that they are not mutually exclusive, since it should be possible to
recognize and weigh the evidence of a formulaic result as part of a ﬂexible
approach.112 The tribunal ﬁnally conﬁrmed that the making of the trade-off
is not an exact science.113
Part 4 of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines determines that the
relevant agencies ‘will not simply compare the magnitude of the cognizable
efﬁciencies with the magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the
efﬁciencies’. These guidelines go on to state that the extent of efﬁciencies
that have to be proved will depend on post-merger concentration. The
trade-off according to this test will not be made by means of the direct
calculation and comparison of efﬁciency beneﬁts and competitive losses. It
uses broader measures to achieve more speciﬁc policy goals.114 In this sense it
is discretionary, but perhaps the term ‘discretionary’ shifts the focus from the
real difference between the US and Canadian approaches.115 The Canadian
approach is more direct than the US one — and the two approaches
represent different ways in which adjudicating authorities realize their policy
goals in the face of difﬁculties regarding proof that a particular trade-off
standard has been met.116
The tribunal did not clearly express the relation that should exist between
the policy that is adopted and the test according to which the trade-off is made.
It is fundamental, however, that a clear policy should be laid down and that it
should form the basis for the applicable test. It may be too difﬁcult to
determine directly whether a particular policy goal is achieved, and then an
indirect test for making the trade-off may become appropriate. (This is the real
lesson of the US approach.) It may also be decided that precise evidence will
not be required, but that an adjudicating body will make an impressionistic
decision. But neither of these approaches detracts from the need to formulate a
clear theoretical basis upon which a trade-off has to be made.
(Of course, the policy approach that a particular competition system
prefers may be changed because of the difﬁculty of establishing whether that
policy has been achieved on the facts of a particular case, but this should be
done only in appropriate circumstances. However, it does not seem that the
112 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 66.
113 With reference to Sanderson op cit note 8. See Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd
supra note 5 para 67; and see also the authority quoted in notes 141 and 143.
114 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4. See also Gifford &
Kudrle op cit note 5 at 463 and Kattan op cit note 6 at 518–19, referring to the
sliding-scale approach. SeeAreeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 976c.
115 Of course the two systems also differ when it comes to the policies that they
follow.
116 On these difﬁculties generally, see also the sources quoted in notes 10, 36 and
99–101.
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problems of proof in the case of the efﬁciency defence are so extreme that
they call for such a solution.) 117
Instead of determining what policy had to be followed in determining the
trade-off, the tribunal in the Trident case merely enquired whether an
efﬁciency gain had to be passed on to consumers. It did not clearly view the
requirement as one of a number of trade-off standards.118 Moreover, the
Trident case was decided after only the ﬁrst decision of the Canadian tribunal
in Superior Propane had been handed down, and the tribunal did not have the
beneﬁt of the careful analysis in later decisions in this matter.
The tribunal contrasted the position in Canada with that in the United
States. It noted that the total-surplus standard was favoured by the majority
of the Canadian tribunal in its ﬁrst Superior Propane case. However, it also
took notice of the dissenting voices both in the Hillsdown119 case and in the
minority judgment in Superior Propane.120 It then acknowledged that the
approach in United States anti-trust law was not settled either, but that the
majority of authorities required that efﬁciencies had to beneﬁt consumers or
lead to lower prices.121 This approach was called ‘less complicated’. The
tribunal concluded that the simplicity of the US approach could in part be
ascribed to the fact that the efﬁciency test was a common-law creation.
These statements cannot, however, be supported. Perhaps the consumer-
oriented standards are easier to understand in the sense that they focus on
consumers and prices. Yet it was shown above that their application is not
necessarily easier than other standards.122 Moreover, the major contributing
factor to the structure of the US approach — which the tribunal seemed to
have overlooked — was that efﬁciency is considered as part of the broad
competition analysis and that it is not separated out by legislation in the same
way as in South Africa and Canada.123 The tribunal concluded that the
United States test is a ‘discretionary tool’ that ‘does not require a trade off
analysis bedeviled by statutory interpretation’.124 This dictum is based on the
tribunal’s somewhat perplexing distinction between discretionary and
formulaic tests — and it is open to two interpretations.
First, it may mean that no trade-off between beneﬁts and losses of the
117 Ross & Winter op cit note 36 at 479 state that ‘simplicity alone is not enough to
justify a criterion that is otherwise without foundation’. See the argument of Brito &
Catalao-Lopes op cit note 85 at 160–8.
118 See Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 paras 68–9.
119 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Hillsdown Holdings (Canada Ltd)
supra note 35 and the comments on this case cited above in note 93.
120 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 69.
121 Ibid paras 69–74, with reference toAreeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6; FTC v
University Health Inc supra note 18 at 1223; FTC v Staples Inc supra note 18 at 1090;
and theUSHorizontalMerger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4.
122 See the text to note 91.
123 See the text to note 23 above as well as that to note 139 below. On the reasons
whyUS law is different fromCanadian law, seeRoss op cit note 85 at 642.
124 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 74.
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merger is made in the United States. Such an interpretation would be
problematic. The standards that focus on the interests of consumers are as
much a trade-off standard as the total surplus standard. To determine
whether consumers will not pay higher prices after the merger, the losses
caused by the merger have to be traded off against the efﬁciency beneﬁts.125
Secondly, it may connote that a trade-off is required even according to the
US approach but that the trade-off is not bedevilled by statutory interpreta-
tion; that the US approach allows adjudicating authorities greater leeway to
lay down indirect tests in terms of which the trade-off can be made. This
interpretation seems preferable. If this is how the statement is to be
understood, it serves as a warning that indirect tests for determining the
impact of efﬁciencies caused by a merger will have to remain within the
bounds set by statute in SouthAfrica and Canada. But it should then be asked
whether the tribunal heeded its own warning.
The tribunal then proposed the following test, which it regarded as
according both with the wording of the statute and international best
practice:
‘[W]here efﬁciencies constitute ‘‘real’’ efﬁciencies and there is evidence to
verify them [the efﬁciencies] of a quantitative and qualitative nature, evidence
that the efﬁciencies will beneﬁt consumers, is less compelling. On the other
hand, where efﬁciencies demonstrate less compelling economies, evidence of a
pass through to consumers should be demonstrated and although no threshold
for this is suggested, they need to be more than trivial, but neither is it necessary
that they are wholly passed on. The test is thus one where real economies and
beneﬁt to consumers exist in an inverse relationship’.126
There is hardly any aspect of this test that is satisfactory:
First, it merely requires proof of real and veriﬁable efﬁciencies for the
justiﬁcation of a merger on efﬁciency grounds. But the magnitude of the
efﬁciencies derived from the merger relative to the market power created by
the merger has to be relevant in establishing the efﬁciency defence.127 If the
mere existence of real and veriﬁable efﬁciencies were to be adequate, then
the South African test would go beyond even the total welfare standard. It
would mean that the efﬁciency could justify a merger even in a case where
125 If this interpretation is accepted it would conﬂict with the previous description
of theUS approach as involving a trade-off: see Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra
note 5 para 65; see also the text to notes 109–10 and, for a wider use of the term
‘trade-off’, Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 35 para 163.
Although the concept of a trade-off is sometimes used in a narrower sense to refer to
the type of situation where losses to consumers exceed gains through efﬁciency (see
Bork op cit note 6 at 110 and 111, referred to in Commissioner of Competition v Superior
Propane Inc supra note 13 para 426 and Röller et al op cit note 6), this does not appear
to be the sense in which the tribunal used the term.
126 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 81; Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg
Food International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd supra note 34 para 125.
127 See the views of Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1668–9 on basing the efﬁciency
defence on the magnitude of efﬁciencies and Yao & Dahdou op cit note 10 at 44 on
the importance of looking at the size of the efﬁciency gain rather than a trade-off.
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the efﬁciency gains from the merger do not exceed the dead-weight loss
caused by it. This would conﬂict directly with the requirement in the statute
that the efﬁciency will have to be ‘greater’ than and ‘offset’ the anti-
competitive effects of the merger. Even in the Trident case the tribunal, in
considering the facts, ultimately placed considerable emphasis on the
magnitude of efﬁciency savings and the extent of market power that would
have been acquired by means of the merger. It concluded that the efﬁciencies
were overwhelming even though they could not be calculated precisely,
while any exercise of market power could take place only up to the import
parity price. The pre-merger price was not far below this point.128 Perhaps
the tribunal thought that its test was merely meant to determine whether
consumers would beneﬁt from the merger after it had already been
determined that the efﬁciency beneﬁts of the merger exceeded its competi-
tive detriments. Yet the tribunal’s formal test does not clearly provide for
such a two-stage approach.129
Secondly, the test suggests that all real efﬁciencies should be treated
equally. However, it is apparent from the ensuing discussion that the tribunal
thought that some real efﬁciencies should be viewed with greater scepticism
than others.130 The tribunal therefore implied that some weighing of real
efﬁciency would have to be undertaken. But it did not indicate how that
should be achieved.131
Thirdly, the tribunal regarded beneﬁt to consumers as relevant, but it did
not state how and why this interest would have to be taken into account.
What does it mean if beneﬁt to consumers is ‘less compelling’? Would it mean
that a merger would then be condemned only if it were to be shown that
consumers would clearly be harmed? If this is how the test is to be interpreted,
it would bring some sense to the evaluation, but it is suggested that this type of
evaluation could be accommodated within a more focused test.
Fourthly, according to the tribunal’s test, ‘pass-through’ to consumers
would have to be shown ‘where efﬁciencies demonstrate less compelling
economies’.132 But what are ‘less compelling economies’? If all real and
veriﬁable efﬁciencies fall into the ﬁrst category, then only pecuniary beneﬁts
could fall into this second category, although it was demonstrated above that
pecuniary efﬁciencies should never form the basis for an efﬁciency defence.
128 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 91. In para 92 the tribunal
called its test a ‘proportionality test’.
129 See Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd
supra note 34 paras 126–9, where a clear trade-off was alsomade.
130 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 81.
131 SeeAreeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 paras 975–6; Sanderson op cit note 8 at
634–5. They indicate how suchweightings can bemade.
132 For severe criticism of the ‘pass through’ terminology see Gifford & Kudrle op
cit note 5 at 443ff.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL356
Moreover, even if it were to be accepted that they should,133 it is clear from
the decision that an efﬁciency defence based on pecuniary beneﬁts is unlikely
to succeed. It is therefore difﬁcult to think of a case where pecuniary beneﬁts
will be so compelling that it will make sense to determine whether
consumers will beneﬁt from them.
The current test is so ﬂawed that a fresh start is required. The new learning
provided by the three Superior Propane judgments (handed down after the
approval of the Trident merger) can form the basis for such a reappraisal.134 It
seems that the total-welfare standard also will not be acceptable in South
Africa: The purposes of the Act are set out in s 2. It determines that
‘efﬁciency, adaptability and development of the economy’135 as well as the
interests of consumers136 must be promoted by competition law, together
with a number of other goals. It therefore seems that the focus in South
Africa cannot merely be on efﬁciency or on consumers.137 Distributional
effects in South Africa will be of the greatest economic and political
importance. Many South Africans are so poor that they will not beneﬁt as
direct or indirect shareholders in any redistributed surplus. Conversely, the
requirement that consumers must always beneﬁt from the efﬁciencies
unnecessarily limits the ambit of the efﬁciency defence and does not allow
for enough of a focus on efﬁciency.138 It undermines the clear separation that
is made in South Africa between the consideration of competition and
efﬁciency concerns in merger adjudication.139
The balancing-weight test proposed in Canada would therefore be
appropriate for South Africa, but it should not be applied in a mathematical
fashion here and must involve ‘discretionary’ elements.140 The value that
should be approaced to the interests of consumers cannot be determined
according to clear norms. Moreover, as was mentioned above, there is a
further problem which the tribunal also tries to cover in its distinction
between ‘discretionary’ and ‘formulaic’ approaches. It may be very difﬁcult
to determine even those aspects that should be precisely determined in terms
of economic models, ie the dead-weight loss and the efﬁciency beneﬁt and
133 The tribunal distinguishes pecuniary and distributional beneﬁts. Most other
authorities do not distinguish these beneﬁts but regard them as the same thing: see the
text to notes 49–54 above.
134 Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.85; Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 35; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane supra
note 7; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 94.
135 Section 2(a).
136 Section 2(b).
137 Cf the position in Canada: Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc
supra note 13 paras 404 et seq and 432; but see the interpretation Commissioner of
Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 35 paras 82–109 and 165.
138 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 69, where this is acknowl-
edged.
139 See the text to note 23 above.
140 See the qualitative approach in Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food International Ash-
ton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd supra note 34 paras 126–9.
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these determinations should be made impressionistically. The tribunal’s
approach can be supported in so far as it suggests that the courts should not
require merging ﬁrms to prove by means of exact mathematical calculations
that the efﬁciency aspects of the merger will outweigh its anti-competitive
consequences, because measurement will be too difﬁcult.141 Although
mathematical evidence will seldom be available, there may be cases where
such evidence will be useful in the analysis of the merger.142 However,
trade-offs should never be regarded as an exact science.143 Perhaps this must
be the ﬁnal legacy of the Trident decision.144
Much can be learnt from the United States approach in this context. The
tribunal should ﬁrst look at the increase in market power that will be caused
by the merger. If it is great, the tribunal should not approve a merger unless
consumer interests carry little weight and it is clear that efﬁciency beneﬁts
will be large. However, if the increase in market power brought about by the
merger is small, it should be easier to convince the tribunal that efﬁciency
beneﬁts can justify a merger and the merger should be allowed unless the
efﬁciency gains are clearly insigniﬁcant or consumer protection is particu-
larly important. Other pieces of information also may be relevant: for
example, where a merger produces a large redistribution of income it may be
an indicator that the merger has an anti-competitive motive.145
Only three further questions then have to be answered:
The ﬁrst is whether effects of the merger in South Africa should only be
taken into account. In considering whether efﬁciencies could justify a
merger, the tribunal in Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food International Ashton
Canning Co (Pty)146 accepted that competitive losses would not be suffered in
South Africa but that the efﬁciencies would be achieved here. This suggests
that anti-competitive effects of, and efﬁciencies caused by, a merger outside
of South Africa will not carry the same weight as effects inside South Africa.
This approach is also taken in other jurisdictions.147 It may not be possible to
141 Rogers op cit note 6 at 524; Berry op cit note 6 at 542; Sanderson op cit note 8 at
631 and 637; Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.86; Commissioner of Competi-
tion v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 para 333 (on the information needed to deter-
mine the distributional effects) and para 431 (on the difﬁculties of making
calculations).
142 See Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 para 233 and
see also the text to note 100 above.
143 See above the text to notes 23 and 124; and Sanderson op cit note 8 and at 637
on the treatment of quantitative estimates.
144 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 as discussed in the text to 109–25.
145 Sanderson op cit note 8 at 630–1.
146 Supra note 34 paras 126–31.
147 Ross op cit note 85 at 646–7; the Canadian Report of the Advisory Panel on
Efficiencies op cit note 11 at 54–5; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc
supra note 7 paras 154 and 192–8. See generally on the national welfare standard
Gifford & Kudrle op cit note 5 at 438–9. See also on consideration of the nationality
of shareholders Ross op cit note 85 at 645;Warner op cit note 5 at 1068.
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delineate effects nationally, but this issue may also be used to make qualitative
judgments and to determine the weight that should be attached to transfers.
The second question is whether a merger can be justiﬁed on the basis of
efﬁciency, even if it causes the merged ﬁrm to become a monopolist in a
relevant market. In Canada it has been accepted that a merger may be
approved on efﬁciency grounds even in these circumstances and that this
aspect can be considered only if it has a speciﬁc further negative impact.148 In
most other jurisdictions the creation of a monopoly will trump efﬁciency.149
Logic would seem to dictate that the Canadian approach should be followed
if the balancing-weights or total-welfare standard is accepted. However, in
circumstances where it is difﬁcult to determine anti-competitive conse-
quences and efﬁciency accurately, it may become difﬁcult to show that a
merger to monopoly should be approved on efﬁciency grounds.
The third question is whether a welfare beneﬁts and losses must be
determined where a merger involves more than one market. It is argued that
each market has to be treated separately, unless it can be shown that beneﬁts
in one market will be achieved only if the merged ﬁrm increased market
power and continued to operate in another market.150
Efficiencies must be merger-specific
The Act determines that an efﬁciency can justify a merger only if ‘it is likely
to result from the merger, and would not likely be obtained if the merger is
148 Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 paras 386 and
414–19; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 7 paras 259ff,
277 and 283–5; Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 94 paras
46–51.
149 In the USHorizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4 it is stated that
‘[e]fﬁciencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly’; EC
Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 84; see Everett & Ross op cit note 4
at 58 and the reference to MSG Media Services IV/M469 paras 100–1. There has also
been considerable criticism of the Canadian approach: Commissioner of Competition v
Superior Propane Inc supra note 35 paras 107–9 and 172–3 and the minority judgment
in Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 94 paras 69 and 72ff;
Canadian Competition Bureau op cit note 4 at 34–5; the Canadian Report of the
Advisory Panel on Efficiencies op cit note 11 at 55–6.
150 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 para 5.2, espe-
cially n53; US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4 (n36); Sander-
son op cit note 8 at 632. See also the text to notes 151 et seq on the requirement of
merger speciﬁcity. The Canadian tribunal in Commissioner of Competition v Superior
Propane Inc supra note 7 at 138–40 calls for a general weighing-up across markets but
does not pay sufﬁcient attention to the fact that efﬁciencies must be obtained in the
least restrictive manner. Cf also EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para
79, in which it is stated that efﬁciencies and competitive detriments ‘in principle’must
be in the same market; and cf further the US position: Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at
1659 with reference to United States v Philadelphia National Bank 374 US 321 (1963).
On the difﬁculties that may arise here, seeWarner op cit note 5 at 1067.
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prevented’.151 Accordingly, efﬁciencies will be recognized only if they are
caused by the merger, that is to say, if they are merger-speciﬁc.152
The competition authorities will have to consider whether efﬁciencies can
be achieved by other means. It will be particularly important to establish
whether the same efﬁciencies can be reached by internal expansion rather
than through merger. There are two reasons why it may be better to require
ﬁrms to expand internally rather than by way of merger:153
• internal expansion is an organic process that is sometimes more likely to
succeed; and
• if the ﬁrm expands internally it will have to win outlets for its products by
competing.
Nevertheless, there may be cases where the achievement of efﬁciencies
through merger will be preferable to internal expansion.154 First, where
efﬁciencies are achieved through the utilization of complementary resources
of merging ﬁrms, internal expansion will not be able to achieve these
beneﬁts. Secondly, internal expansion may be slower in achieving a
particular efﬁciency and delays in achieving greater efﬁciency may them-
selves cause welfare losses. Thirdly, internal expansion may be more costly
for ﬁrms than merger. Such a saving through merger will be a mere
pecuniary gain to the merging ﬁrms, but the cost may deter ﬁrms from
achieving efﬁciencies through internal expansion. If a merger is barred in
such circumstances, it will prevent the merging ﬁrms from becoming more
151 Section 12A(1)(a)(i); Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 paras 10.78–9. See the
different formulations in OECD Report op cit note 4 at 7. See on the information
problems that exist hereYao&Dahdou op cit note 12 at 35–41.
152 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 paras 76–7, 92; Tongaat-Hulett
Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk supra note 12 paras 98 and 105–6; Nasionale Pers
Ltd/Education Investment Corporation Ltd 45/LM/Apr00 paras 44–5; Tiger Brands Ltd/
Langeberg Food International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd supra note 34 para 130;
Inzuzo Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd/PG Bison Holdings (Pty) Ltd 12/LM/Feb04 at
15; Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd/Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 11/LM/Mar05
para 232ff. See the argument in JD Group Ltd/Ellerines Holdings Ltd 78/LM/Jul00 at
30–2, where it was argued that the merged ﬁrm would be able to provide ﬁnancial
services to the ‘unbanked’. The tribunal rejected the argument on the basis that the
merger was not necessary to allow the parties to do so. See the Canadian Competition
Act 1985, s 96(1) and the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note
44 para 5.2, para 8.7. See also the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note
6 part 4, which speaks of merger-speciﬁc gains. These guidelines call veriﬁable and
merger-speciﬁc efﬁciencies ‘cognizable’, and this term is sometimes used by the tri-
bunal in South Africa. See Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane supra note 7
paras 147–9, where the position in the US is contrasted with that in Canada. See the
contrasting approaches set out in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Hills-
down Holdings (Canada Ltd) supra note 35, especially para 141, and Commissioner of
Competition v Superior Propane Inc supra note 13 para 462. See also the EC Horizontal
Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 85, in which it is stated that the only alternatives
that are ‘reasonably practicable in the business circumstances’will be considered.
153 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 973b.
154 Ibid paras 970b and 973b.
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efﬁcient. Fourthly, internal expansion may be necessary before ﬁrms in a
market will achieve efﬁciency without merger, but the size of the market
may not allow all of them to do so.155 In such a situation the only alternative
to the merger will be expansion of some ﬁrms and exit of other ﬁrms from
the market. Investment in expansion by the expanding ﬁrms will be wasteful
if the same expansion could have been achieved through merger. Fifthly, a
major reason why ﬁrms will be loath to expand internally is the ‘capacity
effect’. Expansion will increase the volumes sold in the market and that will
suppress prices. The reduction in prices will often exceed the beneﬁt of the
realized efﬁciency. But the capacity effect frequently can be avoided by
means of merger. Where two merging ﬁrms have inefﬁciently small plants, it
may be possible to rearrange production after a merger in order to achieve
more efﬁcient production without exceeding the output previously pro-
duced by the separate ﬁrms.156
The ‘capacity effect’ will sometimes stand in the way of the realization of
efﬁciency gains through expansion and in such cases it may be preferable to
allow a merger on efﬁciency grounds, even if the merged ﬁrm will acquire or
strengthen its market power. In accordingly it must be determined whether
the capacity effect will deter a ﬁrm from expanding internally. The factors that
should be considered in determining the impact of the capacity effect are:157
• homogeneity of products: the more differentiated the products in the
market, the less likely it will be that internal expansion will be able to
wrestle market share from other ﬁrms;
• size of the capacity increase necessary to achieve the efﬁciency relative to
market size: the greater the required increase in capacity, the greater the
likelihood that the capacity effect will deter expansion;
• elasticity and future trends of demand: the higher the elasticity of
demand and the greater the expansion in demand, the more likely it is
that a ﬁrm will expand internally;
• the magnitude of cost savings: the greater the cost saving, the greater the
likelihood of expansion despite the capacity effect.
Furthermore, there may be transactional alternatives to mergers.158 Mostly
efﬁciencies can only be achieved in a part of the businesses of the merging
ﬁrms.Aﬁrm may, for instance, be of an efﬁcient size to assemble components
but it may not manufacture all components efﬁciently. In such a case it
should be determined whether efﬁcient production cannot be achieved
without a merger.
Where the component can be obtained in the market, the merger should
be allowed on efﬁciency grounds if there are also efﬁciencies in integrating
155 The reason for this is that prices will fall as output increases, see the explanation
of the capacity effect in the text to note 156 below.
156 See the text to notes 186–8 and 192–5.
157 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 973b.
158 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 para 8.17. See
especially the consideration of other mergers as an alternative.
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the production of this component with the assembly of other components in
a single ﬁrm. Efﬁciency of integration will depend on whether there is an
efﬁcient market for the component and whether the transaction costs in
contracting for the input will be high. If two hospitals argue that their merger
should be allowed because they both have to maintain inefﬁciently small
laboratories, it must be determined whether such a service can be contracted
for more cheaply in the market — and if it is possible, the merger should not
be allowed on the basis of the perceived efﬁciency. The cost saving that
should be allowed for the purpose of determining whether the merger ought
to be approved will merely be the difference between the cost at which the
merged ﬁrm will produce and the cost of obtaining it in the market.159
It may be possible to achieve the same types of efﬁciencies by means of a
joint venture or a licensing agreement between ﬁrms, rather than through
merger, even if such components cannot be acquired in the market.160
However, joint ventures and licensing agreements may increase transaction
costs and the likelihood of anti-competitive co-operation between ﬁrms.161
These disadvantages must be balanced against the advantages of allowing the
merger even though it may be very difﬁcult to quantify transaction costs.162
If the manufacture of a component is a signiﬁcant part of the activities of the
merging ﬁrms, a joint venture between them will not be a viable alternative
to merger since a joint venture will not be markedly different from a merger
between the ﬁrms, especially if the joint venture is to endure for an unlimited
or unspeciﬁed time.
Similar arguments will apply where ﬁrms produce and supply a range of
complementary products. Where all or most products are produced inefﬁ-
ciently, there will be a strong argument for merger. A joint venture in such
circumstances will be indistinguishable from a merger. Where only a small
number of products is produced inefﬁciently, a joint venture between ﬁrms
may be a less invasive vehicle for producing those products efﬁciently.
Furthermore, it may be more effective to purchase in the market the products
that are produced inefﬁciently. Nevertheless, the last alternative will not be
viable if complementarity depends on production within one ﬁrm.163
159 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 974c. See especially the argument
regarding market power of a supplier. The authors argue that such power will be
short-lived if integration is possible.
160 ECHorizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 81: this will then have to be
taken into account in the analysis of the joint venture.
161 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 973c.
162 This was not done in Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk supra note
12 para 106.
163 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975d2, and see on luxury products the
text to note 205 below.
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Likelihood that efficiencies will materialize, timeliness and substantiality
The tribunal has accepted that the likelihood of the achievement of
efﬁciency will have to be veriﬁed.164 But it has not explicitly required that
efﬁciencies be likely.165 It is suggested that this is an omission. Section
12A(1)(a)(i) applies only to efﬁciencies that ‘may result or [are] likely to
result’ from the merger.166
There are indications in the EC Merger Guidelines that an efﬁciency will
only be considered in that jurisdiction if it is shown that it will be realized in a
timely manner.167 There is no need for such a requirement in South Africa,
but a delay in the realization of efﬁciencies should be relevant when it is
determined whether a merger can be justiﬁed on the basis of that
efﬁciency.168
Next, the tribunal has not required that efﬁciencies be substantial.169 It has
remarked that ‘each claimed cent in cost savings’ cannot be relevant in
determining whether a merger is efﬁcient.170 However, this comment was
made when the tribunal considered the types of efﬁciencies that may be
considered for the purpose of the efﬁciency defence. Conversely, Areeda and
Hovenkamp argue that only substantial efﬁciencies should be recognized.
They state that almost all mergers will create some efﬁciencies, that this is the
reason why only substantial anti-competitive effects will lead to a merger
becoming illegal, and that if ordinary efﬁciencies that are not substantial are
taken into account they will be counted twice.171 But this argument is not
persuasive.172 If it is found that efﬁciencies are insubstantial, they will not be
counted twice as they will not convince an adjudicating authority that the
merger should be justiﬁed on the basis of efﬁciency. There is no need for a
164 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 63. See generally on these
issues Sutherland &Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.77–8.
165 But see also the discussion of the credibility of efﬁciency claims: Trident Steel
(Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 75.
166 In US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4 it is stated that
only ‘likely efﬁciencies will be considered’.
167 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 79 where this is mentioned
in the context of beneﬁts to consumers.
168 See also the EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 83: ‘[T]he later
the efﬁciencies are expected to materialize in the future, the less weight the Commis-
sion can assign to them.’ See on the discounting of time, the Canadian Merger
Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 para 5.7.1; Kattan op cit note 6 at 519.
169 Although it has not expressly rejected such a requirement. But see the reference
in Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 59 to the US Horizontal Merger
Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4, where substantiality is emphasized, and para 85
where it was noted that certain efﬁciencies were substantial.
170 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 52.
171 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 974a; EC Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines op cit note 5 para 79 where this is mentioned in the context of beneﬁts to
consumers. See also the argument in para 973b8.
172 See also Sanderson op cit note 8 at 631.
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requirement that only substantial efﬁciencies should be taken into account in
terms of the efﬁciency defence.
Verification
The tribunal looked at veriﬁability when it analysed the balancing of
anti-competitive and efﬁciency issues, but conceptually this issue should
stand on its own.173 Competition authorities should be careful when
considering efﬁciencies as they are ‘easy to assert and sometimes difﬁcult to
disprove’.174 Vague and speculative claims that cannot be veriﬁed by
reasonable means should not be taken into account. The tribunal has noted
that efﬁciencies have to be assessed quantitatively and that the likelihood that
they will occur must be established. But the authorities to which it referred
show that veriﬁcation has to take place on a much broader level.175 The
likelihood, magnitude, time and manner of achievement as well as the
merger speciﬁcity of claimed efﬁciencies should be veriﬁable by reasonable
means.176 Nevertheless, the veriﬁcation requirement should not be applied
too strictly. The emphasis should be on ‘reasonable means’. Veriﬁcation
should not undermine the stated preference of the tribunal for approaching
evidence of efﬁciencies impressionistically.177 In particular, care should be
taken when dynamic efﬁciencies are considered as it will often be difﬁcult to
verify these efﬁciencies.
THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF EFFICIENCIES CONSIDERED
We have seen that a merger can be justiﬁed either on the basis of dynamic
efﬁciency or production efﬁciency,178 and these efﬁciencies can now be
evaluated against the requirements for the efﬁciency defence that have been
developed in the preceding sections.179
Dynamic efﬁciencies will seldom be quantiﬁable and will have to be
evaluated qualitatively.180 Where there are relatively clear synergies in the
research conducted by merging ﬁrms, a merger will increase their likelihood
of being successful with research and development. This will be a strong
argument for allowing a merger. But in many cases claims of dynamic
173 See the text just after note 33 above. See Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 para
10.77 on veriﬁcation generally.
174 Gifford &Kudrle op cit note 5 at 463.
175 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 63.
176 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4, referred to in
Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 63; EC Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines op cit note 5 paras 86–7; Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit
note 44 para 8.9.
177 See the text to note 141 above.
178 See the text to notes 42–60 above.
179 See Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 paras 10.86–10.90. For different typolo-
gies of efﬁciencies, seeRöller et al op cit note 6 at 12–14.
180 See the text to note 46 above and the CanadianMerger Enforcement Guidelines
2004 op cit note 44 para 8.15.
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efﬁciency will falter because they can be achieved in less restrictive ways, ie
through joint ventures.181 Firms will sometimes be loath to invest in research
and development because the beneﬁts will also be available to their
competitors. A merger may accordingly internalize the beneﬁts of research
and development and therefore serve as an incentive for innovation. But
other features of relevant markets and the nature of the research may point in
a different direction. Firms that have market power, for instance, may be
more reluctant to invest in research where the risk of failure is high.182
Various types of production efﬁciencies have been distinguished interna-
tionally:183
First, several efﬁciencies may be achieved at plant level.184 Plant size and
specialization efﬁciencies have often been described as those production
efﬁciencies that are most worthy of protection:185
(i) Economies of scale are achieved where average cost-per-unit is reduced
because of the increase in the number of units produced.186 These
efﬁciencies can be achieved where the production of a plant (that does
not produce at its optimum level) can be increased post-merger. Where
a merger takes place between ﬁrms that produce the same product, the
merged ﬁrm, at least in the short run, will frequently have merely two
inefﬁcient plants. But the ﬁrm can of course close one plant and achieve
economies in the other. Output can be increased to efﬁcient levels
without an increase of total output in the market and a concomitant
reduction in prices (the so-called capacity effect).187 Where output is
increased it may allow for greater mechanization of functions that were
181 Balto op cit note 6 paras 76–8.
182 Röller et al op cit note 6 at 18.
183 The South African tribunal mentioned most of these issues in Trident Steel (Pty)
Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 paras 55 et seq with reference to Sanderson op cit note 8,
especially at 632–3. See Sutherland & Kemp op cit note 3 para 10.77. See especially
the list in the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44Appen-
dix II. For the United States, see Balto op cit note 6 at 74; Joseph F Brodley ‘Proof of
efﬁciencies in mergers and joint ventures’ (1996) 64 Antitrust LJ 575; Warner op cit
note 5 at 1070–2;Werden op cit note 6 at 12; Kattan op cit note 6 at 528–34; Fisher &
Lande op cit note 5 at 1599ff.
184 See especially the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note
44 Appendix II and Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44
para 8.14. See on plant-level efﬁciencies Scherer op cit note 63 at 1002f. See how
certain efﬁciencies are prioritized in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op
cit note 6 part 4.
185 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 56 with reference to Sander-
son op cit note 8 at 632 andAreeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975; Kattan op
cit note 6 at 530.
186 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44Appendix II and
Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44 para 8.14. See Fisher
& Lande op cit note 5 at 1600 for the types of circumstances where these types of
efﬁciencies are likely to exist.
187 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975b. See the discussion of the capacity
effect above in the text to notes 156–8; Balto op cit note 6 at 74–5.
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previously performed manually.188 In Trident Steel an important part of
the business of the merging ﬁrms was to produce improved surface
ﬁnish (ISF) products. Trident had machinery for turning low-quality
steel into ISF products. But this machinery was under-utilized. After
the merger Trident’s plant would become an efﬁcient producer of ISF
blanks.
(ii) Greater output may allow a ﬁrm to become more efﬁcient through
specialization.
(iii) The Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines list the elimination of
duplication, reduced down-time, a smaller base of spare parts, smaller
inventory requirements, and the avoidance of capital expenditures that
would otherwise be required as efﬁciencies that may arise at plant level
as plant efﬁciencies.189 A merger that raises the volumes produced by a
ﬁrm may also justify investment in the building of a new, more efﬁcient
plant or the improvement of an existing plant.190
(iv) Economies of scope will exist if products that were separately produced
by merging ﬁrms can be more efﬁciently produced together within a
particular plant in the merged ﬁrm.191
Secondly, several multi-plant efﬁciencies also may be achieved through
merger:
(i) A merger can bring about a division of production between plants that
will improve economies of scale in a number of plants. If each of the
merging ﬁrms produces two differentiated products in a single plant and
it causes the output of each product to be inefﬁciently low, then
production of each product can be dedicated to one of the plants
post-merger in order to achieve efﬁcient outputs in each plant.192
(ii) Savings may be achieved at multi-plant level through specialization.193
It may be more costly for ﬁrms to have a single plant that produces a
range of products than it would be for a merged ﬁrm to dedicate
production of speciﬁc products to particular plants owned by it.194 In
Trident one of the merging ﬁrms, Baldwins, was forced to tie up a press
feed line that was intended for punching holes and dropouts, for the
ﬁnishing of ISF products. It did not have specialized equipment for
producing ISF blanks. In turn Trident, the other merger ﬁrm, could
188 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44Appendix II and
CanadianMerger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44 para 8.14.
189 Ibid.
190 Scherer op cit note 63 at 1008. See also Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food Interna-
tional Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd supra note 34 para 130.
191 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 Appendix II;
Röller et al op cit note 6 at 16.
192 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975b; US Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4; Balto op cit note 6 at 75; Röller et al op cit note 6 at 15.
193 Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd supra
note 34 paras 118–20; seeRöller et al op cit note 6 at 16.
194 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 paras 975c-d.
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efﬁciently produce ISF products but was not able to do the type of
pressing that Baldwins performed in its plant. After the merger the
Baldwins line could be dedicated to the pressing of blanks and the
Trident line for manufacturing ISF products. This would make the
merged ﬁrm more efﬁcient than the merging ﬁrms. Apparently there
were economies of integration in being able to perform both functions
and the merged ﬁrm would have the ability to service customers who
required pressed blanks.195
(iii) Multi-plant-level savings also can take the form of the rationalization of
management, administrative functions (such as sales, marketing,
accounting, purchasing, ﬁnance and production), and research and
development activities.196 However, these types of beneﬁts often will
not be merger-speciﬁc or substantial enough to justify an anti-
competitive merger.197 Rationalization frequently takes the form of the
dismissal of redundant employees. But there are difﬁculties with the
recognition of these efﬁciencies? In Trident the tribunal observed that
one of the public-interest criteria that has to be considered in evaluating
a merger in accordance with s 12A(1)(a)(ii) read with 12A(3)(b) is the
effect that the merger has on employment, and it then concluded that
this meant that efﬁciency through redundancy cannot be taken into
account as ‘[t]he legislature can hardly be seen to be giving a defence in
one section . . . and taking it away in another’.198 However, there are
many situations where greater competition leads to unemployment. In
all of these situations the main purpose of competition law is to
promote competition. The Act does not contain an absolute prohibi-
tion on the dismissal of employees for the sake of efﬁciency. The
public-interest criteria make it possible for an adjudicating body to trade
off public interest concerns against conclusions reached in achieving its
main goals of promoting and protecting efﬁciency through competi-
tion. Indeed, no merger has been prohibited on the basis that it causes
unemployment. There is no reason why efﬁciencies created by the
dismissal of redundant employees should not be taken into account in
terms of the efﬁciency defence. But an adjudicating body must then
195 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 86. The tribunal stated that
these efﬁciencies would not have been achieved otherwise. It did not ask whether it
would have been possible for Baldwins to purchase ISF blanks, but it was apparent
that Baldwins was run at a loss: see para 92.
196 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44Appendix II and
Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44 para 8.14. See Kattan
op cit note 6 at 532–3 on research and development. See generally on rationalization
Röller et al op cit note 6 at 14–5.
197 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 op cit note 6 part 4. Joint ventures with
regard to research and development may achieve the same beneﬁts as mergers; see the
ECHorizontalMerger Guidelines op cit note 5 para 81.
198 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 para 80. The tribunal could have
added that one of the purposes of s 2 is to promote employment.
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revisit the redundancies when it considers the impact of the merger on
the public interest. Perhaps South African competition authorities,
unlike their counterparts in most other countries (where legislation
does not allow for consideration of public interest), should be even
more clinical in considering the efﬁciency consequences of redundan-
cies under the rubric of the efﬁciency defence. The public-interest
consequences of redundancies will receive adequate attention when the
impact of the merger on public interest is considered in the last phase of
the adjudication of a merger.
Thirdly, efﬁciencies at the product level will ordinarily take the form of
‘economies of scale’.199 Amerger may spread ﬁxed costs over a larger output
of products and may thereby reduce the average unit cost per product.200
Fourthly, plant and multi-plant efﬁciencies also may be achieved with
regard to purchasing, distribution, advertising, capital raising, complemen-
tary resources and the transferring of superior production techniques or
know-how:201
(i) Where a ﬁrm is merely able to purchase from suppliers at a lower cost
because of its powerful bargaining position, the beneﬁt to the merging
ﬁrm will be pecuniary.202 It should not be taken into account in
determining whether a merger ought to be allowed. However, if a
supplier is able to supply the merged ﬁrm more cheaply because of
greater efﬁciency, then real efﬁciencies are realized. There are efﬁcien-
cies that may be considered,203 although it will frequently be possible to
show that the same beneﬁts can be achieved by less restrictive means
such as joint ventures.204
(ii) A merger may improve the efﬁciency of distribution. However,
merging ﬁrms may rely on this type of efﬁciency only if they can show
that there are economies of integration in self-distribution of products.
This, for instance, will be the case where a ﬁrm supplies luxury products
which have to be distributed through integrated exclusive outlets.205
199 Kattan op cit note 6 at 530 states that economies of scale will be particularly
relevant in decliningmarkets.
200 CanadianMerger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44Appendix II.
201 Ibid and the newCanadianMerger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44
para 8.14; Scherer op cit note 63 at 1008. Transfer of superior production techniques
or know-how is mentioned in the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991
Appendix II in the general introduction and where more speciﬁc efﬁciencies are
enumerated. In the 2004 version it is mentioned only in the introduction.
202 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5 paras 55 nn40 and 90, with refer-
ence to the CanadianMerger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 para 5.3.
203 Ibid paras 87–90; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Hillsdown Hold-
ings (Canada Ltd) supra note 35 para 139n73; Canadian Merger Enforcement Guide-
lines 1991 op cit note 44 para 5.3. See generally Röller et al op cit note 6 at 18–9.
204 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975i and Olin Corporation 113 FTC 400
(FTC 1990).
205 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975e1.
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(iii) Promotional efﬁciency is achieved when a larger output of products is
being advertised. Only a very large output would, for instance, justify
nationwide television advertisements. However, merging ﬁrms should
be allowed to merge to achieve this type of efﬁciency only if they are at
a competitive disadvantage to other ﬁrms that are able to advertise and if
less restrictive alternatives such as joint ventures are not viable.206
(iv) The question whether the efﬁciency of capital-raising can be taken into
account in terms of the efﬁciency defence is somewhat controversial.
Bulk will be necessary to allow a ﬁrm to raise capital in the public
ﬁnancial markets. Greater size may be obtained through merger. Yet,
Areeda & Hovenkamp do not believe that efﬁcient capital-raising can
help to justify a merger: if mere size is necessary to gain access to sources
of capital, ﬁrms should rather achieve it through mergers that do not
raise competition concerns.207 However, it will often be more attractive
to investors if a ﬁrm is focused on a particular type of business in a
particular market. This may serve to justify a horizontal merger in order
to gain access to capital markets. Especially in South Africa, where
markets for capital are not as efﬁcient as they are in the United States,
efﬁciencies in the raising of capital should not be ignored.
(iv) Areeda and Hovenkamp are also against the justiﬁcation of a merger on
the basis that the merging ﬁrms have complementary resources.208 They
give two reasons, namely that these efﬁciencies can be achieved by less
restrictive means and are so pervasive that their acceptance will lead to
unjustiﬁed increases in market power through mergers. The ﬁrst
argument will not stand in the way of ﬁrms that have unique
complementarities. The second argument can be rejected out of hand.
As long as efﬁciencies are substantial and real, there is no reason why
they should be ignored merely because they are pervasive. Although
efﬁciencies based on complementarity may be pervasive, they will
seldom be of a sufﬁcient magnitude to have a profound impact on
merger evaluations. Where ﬁrms have complementary resources and
they are situated close to each other this may form a basis for an
efﬁciency defence, unless it can be shown that some other form of
co-operation could achieve the same efﬁciencies.209
(v) The transfer of superior production techniques and know-how may
allow a merged ﬁrm to produce more efﬁciently than the merging
206 Ibid para 975f. See on promotion and distribution efﬁciencies: Balto op cit note
6 at 75–6; Röller et al op cit note 6 at 18.
207 Areeda & Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975h. But see Röller et al op cit note 6
at 19.
208 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 para 975k.
209 Kattan op cit note 6 at 531 and the discussion of the LTV/Republican merger,
which in some ways is echoed in South Africa by Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food
International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd supra note 34 paras 119–20, although the
tribunal stressed that it concerned specialization. See above note 193. See also Balto
op cit note 6 at 75 and Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1622 on this merger.
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ﬁrms, and should be regarded as relevant to an efﬁciency defence as
long as the same beneﬁts cannot be achieved by less restrictive means
such as joint ventures.210
Fifthly, one of the major economic justiﬁcations for mergers is that they
allow assets to end up in the hands of managers who are best able to manage
them efﬁciently.211 But can more efﬁcient management of a merging ﬁrm be
an efﬁciency justiﬁcation for a merger? This issue has not yet received careful
attention in SouthAfrica. Most other jurisdictions, however, do not allow an
efﬁciency defence on this basis. Management skills are seldom so unique that
they can be improved only through merger. The shareholders of a company
will have the power to see to it that inefﬁcient managers are replaced by
more efﬁcient ones.212
Sixthly, where production activities that were previously performed
outside of the ﬁrm by third parties are brought into a ﬁrm by means of
merger, this may bring about efﬁciencies in the form of savings of transaction
costs. These are real efﬁciencies. But the saving of transaction costs is so
difﬁcult to calculate and to verify that it will seldom play a part in the
efﬁciency defence.213
CONCLUSION
The locus classicus in respect of the efﬁciency defence in South Africa,
Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd,214 made a valuable contribution to its
development. The defence succeeded in this case and this set the tone at an
early stage in the development of competition law in South Africa. The
efﬁciency defence is taken seriously in SouthAfrica and it is possible to justify
a merger on the basis of efﬁciency in this country. However, several speciﬁc
aspects of the efﬁciency defence need to be reﬁned. The Trident case was
decided so early in the life of the tribunal that the judgment does not exhibit
the same level of maturity as that present in more recent judgments.
Furthermore, it was decided at a time when the law regarding the efﬁciency
defence in the inﬂuential jurisdiction of Canada was in a state of ﬂux. The
speciﬁc test for the application of the efﬁciency defence is therefore ﬂawed in
several fundamental respects, and a sharp change of direction is required to
correct these ﬂaws.
210 Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44 Appendix II.
The new Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines 2004 op cit note 44 sets it out in
para 8.13; Röller et al op cit note 6 at 17.
211 Fisher & Lande op cit note 5 at 1601–2. See also Röller et al op cit note 6 at
18–23.
212 Areeda &Hovenkamp op cit note 6 paras 974b2 and 975k2; Kattan op cit note 6
at 529. See also the European decision of Aerospatiale/Alenia/DeHavilland Case
IV/M157 paras 65–9.
213 CanadianMerger Enforcement Guidelines 1991 op cit note 44Appendix II.
214 Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd/Dorbyl Ltd supra note 5.
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